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ARTICLE 
CONSENSUS AMONG MANY 
VOICES: 
ARTICULATING THE EUROPEAN 
UNION'S POSITION 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
NUNO S. LACASTA, SURAJE DESSAI & EVA POWROSLO* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"We all recognize that climate change is one of the most 
threatening issues that we are facing today ... We cannot ne-
gotiate with the Climate! We need to take action, now." -
Margot Wallstrom, European Commissioner for Environment! 
"Europe is resolved to act and has mobilized to fight the 
greenhouse effect." - Jacques Chirac, French President 
• Nuno S. Lacasta is Senior Adviser for International Mfairs at the Portuguese 
Ministry for the Environment, and Visiting Professor of Comparative Environmental 
Law at the American University's Washington College of Law (WCUAU). At the time 
of this writing he was European Of Counsel at the Center for International Environ-
mental Law (CIEL-Washington, DC) and Senior Fellow for EURONATURA-Centre for 
Environmental Policy and Sustainable Development (Lisbon, Portugal). He holds a 
Bachelor of Laws degree from Lisbon University's Law School and a LL.M from 
WCUAU. Suraje Dessai is a PhD candidate at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
Research, UK, and Associate Researcher with EURONATURA. He holds a degree in 
Environmental Sciences from the University of East Anglia, UK. Eva Powroslo is a 
lawyer in Germany. She holds a Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of Co-
logne and a LL.M from the School of Oriental and Mrican Studies, University of Lon-
don, UK. She was a Law Fellow with CIEL in the fall of 2001. The authors would like 
to thank Sebastian Oberthiir, Glenn Wiser, Paul KibeI, and Joao Gon<;alves for review-
ing this article. Any errors or omissions are, however, the authors' full responsibility. 
1 Speech by European Environment Commissioner, Margot Wallstriim, Environ-
ment European Climate Change Program: A Successful Approach to Combating Cli-
mate Change, ECCP Conference Brussels, 2 July 2001. Available at: http://www.eu-
ropa.eu.inUrapidlstart/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECHlO1l322I 0 I RA 
PID&Ig=EN (visited Dec. 6, 2001). 
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" ... [C]limate change is already upon us. But it can get much 
worse if we fail to act." - John Prescott, UK Deputy Prime 
Minister 
"The fight against the greenhouse [effect] cannot be delayed." 
- Jiirgen Trittin, German Environment Minister 
As the above statements2 from European leaders attest, 
the issue of climate change ranks high on the continent's politi-
cal agenda. In fact, the European Union (EU)3 and its Member 
States have for over a decade claimed domestic and interna-
tionalleadership with regard to the challenge of global warm-
ing.4 The EU has historically supported both the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC),5 as well as its 1997 Kyoto Protocol.6 After the 
United States withdrawal from the latter in mid 2001,7 the EU 
2 The last three statements presented were made in 2000 at Sixth Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
which took place in The Hague from November 13·25, 2000. See list of statements, in 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.1, at 25·26. Available at: http://unfccc.int/rsource/cop6 
.html (visited January 10, 2001). 
3 The European Union (EU), established by the 1992 Treaty on European Union 
(also known as Maastricht Treaty), available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/eurlexl 
enltreaties/datleu30ns _treatY3n.pdf> (visited Dec. 11, 2001), consists of three pillars: 
the European Communities (European Community [EC), European Coal and Steel 
Community and European Atomic Energy Community); the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy; and co·operation in home affairs and justice policy. Although the use 
of terms may sometimes be incorrect as a strict legal matter (see for a detailed explana· 
tion of this terminology Nigel Haigh, Climate Change Policies and Politics in the Euro· 
pean Community, in POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTNE (Tim 
O'Riordan & Jill Jager eds., 1996 [hereinafter O'RIORDAN & JAGER) 155-156 [hereinaf-
ter Haigh)), following common practice in the context of climate negotiations, the term 
"EU" will be used consistently, without distinction as to which entity, the EU or the 
EC, acts in the specific circumstances (cf. SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR & HERMANN E. OTT, 
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 14 
(1999)[hereinafter OBERTHUR & OTT). 
4 For an in-depth analysis of European leadership on climate change, see JOYETA 
GUPTA AND MICHAEL GRUBB (EDS.) CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP 
(2000) [hereinafter GUPTA & GRUBB)). 
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, reprinted 
in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), available at <http://www.unfccc.intlresource/conv/index.html> 
(visited Dec. 10, 2001) [hereinafter UNFCCC or Convention). 
6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Conference of the Parties, 3rd Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/19971 
L.7/Add.l, adopted Dec. 10, 1997, opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998 available at 
<http://www.unfccc.int Iresource/docs/convkplkpeng.pdf> (visited Dec. 10, 2001) [here-
inafter Kyoto Protocol or Protocol). 
7 See e.g. "Oh no, Kyoto," The Economist (Apr. 7, 2001). For a summary of initial 
reactions to the U.S. withdrawal from Kyoto, see Gom,alo Cavalheiro & Nuno Lacasta, 
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has continued to actively pursue the Protocol's ratification and 
entry into force by the time of the World Summit on Sustain-
able Development in 2002.8 In fact, the ED and its Member 
States have recently ratified the Protocol,9 Following is a brief 
overview of the international climate regimelO since 1992 (see 
table 1, below).l1 








Emergence of scientific concern 
Negotiation of UNFCCC 
Entry into force and First Con-
ference of the Parties (COP-I) 
Negotiation of Kyoto Protocol 
Preparations for Protocol entry 
into force and implementation 
'1 Oppose the Kyoto Protocol": au Como se Deita um Acordo Internacional no Lixo! 
Euronatura Working Paper 1/2001, April 2001, available at: www.euronatura.pt (vis-
ited Dec. 12, 2001). 
8 See e.g. 2399th European Council of Environmental Ministers, Brussels, December 
12-13, 2001, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start Icgilguesten.ksh?p_ ac-
tion.gettxt=gt&doc=PRES/01/459I 0 I RAPID&Ig=EN&display= (visited June 1, 2002). 
9 See e.g. "EU Ratifies Global Warming Treaty: Kyoto Accord En Route to Becoming 
Law Despite U.S. Rejection," The Washington Post, (June 1, 2002), at A15 [hereinafter 
EU ratification). 
10 We use in our analysis Krasner's definition of "regimes" as "Sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations." See INTERNATIONAL 
REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner, ed.), 1982, at. 186. For an application of the main 
theories of international relations to the issue of climate change, see I. H. Rowlands, 
Major theoretical approaches, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE (D. Sprinz D. and U. Luterbacher, eds.), 1996 [hereinafter SPRINZ & 
LUTERBACHER), at 32-39. 
11 See for reviews and analyses of the UNFCCC negotiation, IRVING M. MINTZER AND 
J. AMBER LEONARD (EDS.), NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
RIO CONVENTION (1994); and Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J INTL L 451-558 (1993). For re-
view and analyses of the Kyoto Protocol, see OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3; 
MICHAEL GRUBB, CHRISTIAAN VROLIJK AND DUNCAN BRACK, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A 
GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999) [hereinafter GRUBB ET AL); Clare Breidenich et aI., The 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM 
J INTL L 315-326 (1998); and Nuno S. Lacasta and Pedro Martins Barata, Analise do 
Protocolo de Quioto sobre Altera~iies Climaticas, 4-5 Rev. de D. Ambiente e Ordena-
mento do Territ6rio, 105-131 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter Lacasta & Barata). 
12 From Farhana Yamin, The Role of the EU in Climate Negotiations, in GUPTA & 
GRUBB, supra note 4, at 48. [hereinafter Yamin). For a detailed account of the first 
three phases ofEU climate policy, see Haigh, supra note 3, at 161-185. 
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The Convention's ultimate objective is to "achieve stabili-
zation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system."13 In the face of mounting climate 
science 14 and in recognizing that the UNFCCC was only a first 
step in addressing the challenge of global warming, the inter-
national community decided to take on more stringent com-
mitments and adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This land-
mark international agreement obliges developed countries and 
economies in transition (Annex B Parties) to reduce their over-
all emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHGs)15 to "at least" five 
percent16 below 1990 levels during the 2008-2012 "commitment 
period."17 In order to meet their commitments in an economi-
cally efficient manner, Parties can make use of market-based 
instruments known as the Kyoto mechanisms (International 
Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and the Clean De-
velopment Mechanism).18 Parties can also choose to use to-
ward their emission reduction commitments activities enhanc-
ing the ability of forests to store carbon (also known as land use 
change and forest activities or "sinks").19 Such activities are 
currently limited to afforestation, reforestation, and deforesta-
tion, although Article 3.4 leaves a door open for the inclusion of 
other activities.20 
13 Article 2 UNFCCC, supra note 5. 
14 See CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (J.T. Houghton et 
al. Eds., 1996). This Second Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) (established in 1988), which has been elaborated with the 
contribution from over 2000 scientists from all over the world, provided the scientific 
foundation for the strengthening of the international response to climate change that 
culminated in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. The IPCC has recently updated that 
report after a third assessment. See also CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 
(J.T. Houghton et al. Eds., 2001). 
15 The six GHGs are carbon dioxide (COz), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (NzO), hy-
drofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
16 Emissions limitation or reduction are differentiated for each party: e.g. the EU 
reduces by 8%, the U.S. by 7%, Japan by 6%, Russia and Ukraine stabilise, whereas 
Australia increases by 8% and Iceland by 10%. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, An-
nex B. 
17 [d. Article 3 
18 [d. Article 6, 12 and 17. 
19 [d. Article 3.3 and 3.4. 
20 Indeed, at the resumed Sixth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-
6.5), in mid 2001, Parties have agreed to also include as "sinks" activities those of crop-
land management, grazing land management and re-vegetation. In addition, and most 
importantly, each Annex B Party was allocated a quantity of tons of carbon uptake it 
4
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The Kyoto Conference raised the issue of climate change 
into the arena of "high politics" with the involvement of inter 
alia U.S. President Clinton, United Kingdom (UK) and Japan's 
Prime Ministers Blair and Hashimoto and Germany's Chancel-
lor Koh1.21 The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol was seen as a 
major success for international environmental cooperation, 
even though it left myriad matters unfinished and nearly broke 
down at some critical stages.22 In November 1998, the Fourth 
Conference of Parties (COP-4) 23 to the FCCC adopted the Bue-
nos Aires Plan of Action (BAP A), an ambitious work program 
on some of the key issues to be finalized by COP-B. 24 This 
work program was, however, only finished at COP-7 in 2001, 
after a collapse of the negotiations at COP-B in late 2000.25 As 
can account towards its emissions target from forest management activities. See Re· 
port of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixth Session, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties. 6th Sess., U. N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/200115 (with two addenda) [hereinafter COP·6.5 Report]. At the Seventh 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP· 7), in November 2001, Parties further 
specified the operational rules with regard to the treatment of "sinks" under the Proto· 
col. See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 7th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. UNFCCC/CP/2001113 (with four addenda» [hereinafter COP·7 Report]. Docu· 
ments also available at: www.fccc.int(visitedOct.11. 2001). For an overview ofCOP·7, 
including the provisions on "sinks," see Donald Goldberg & Katherine Silverthorne, The 
Marrakech Accords, American Bar Association's Climate Change and Sustainable 
Development Committee Newsletter, Vol. 5, No.2, January 2002, at 1·6 [hereinafter 
"Goldberg & Silverthorne"]. 
21 See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3. 
22Id. 
23 COP refers to "Conference of the Parties." Hereinafter, a numeral following the 
acronym refers to the specific meeting, which have taken place annually since the 
Convention entered into force in March 21, 1994 (U.N. Doc. FCCC/1995/Inf.3, at 1). The 
convention's Parties have met for seven times since its adoption in 1992. COP·1 met in 
Berlin in 1995 (see Report of COP·1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7 (with one adden· 
dum)[hereinafter COP·1 Report]; COP·2 in Geneva in 1996 (see Report of COP·2 U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CPI1996/15 (with one addendum and one corrigendum» [hereinafter COP·2 
Report]; COP·3 in Kyoto in 1997 (see Report of COP·3, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/199717 
(with one addendum and two corrigenda» [hereinafter COP·3 Report]; COP·4 in Bue· 
nos Aires in 1998 (see COP·4 Report U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1998/16 (with one adden· 
dum» [hereinafter COP·4 Report]; COP·5 in Bonn in 1999 (FCCC/CP/1999/6 (with one 
addendum)) [hereinafter COP·5 Report], COP·6 (which had two sessions in the Hague 
in 2000 and in Bonn in 2001 (COP·6.5) (see COP·6 Report, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2000/5 
(with four addenda, including 5 volumes to Add.3) and COP·6.5 Report, supra note 20.; 
and COP·7 in Marrakech in 2001 (see COP·7 report, supra note 20). All documents 
listed available at <http://www.unfccc.int> (visited Oct. 11,2001). 
24 Those issues included the financial mechanism, technology transfer, adverse 
effects, activities implemented jointly (AIJ) under the pilot phase, the Kyoto mecha· 
nisms, the monitoring, reporting and verification rules and a compliance regime for the 
Protocol. See Cop·4 Report, supra note 23. 
25 See Suraje Dessai, Why did the Hague Climate Conference Fail?, 10 Environ· 
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a result, Parties met at the resumed COP-6 (COP-6.5), already 
without the U.S. as an active negotiating Party, and reached 
agreement on a political package-the Bonn Agreement-on 
the Protocol's operational rules. 26 This political agreement was 
later complemented with legal texts-the Marrakech Accords-
at COP-7 in late 2001.27 These agreements have paved the way 
for the ratification and entry into force of the Protocol, which is 
expected in 2003. 
This article attempts to provide an overview of key policy 
elements of the European Union's climate policy since the 
adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 (see table 1 above). Section II 
discusses the main features of the EU as an actor vis-a.-vis its 
Member States and the international community at large. Sec-
tion III identifies the key actors at play in the EU context; Sec-
tion IV analyzes the ED's track record on domestic policies and 
measures. Section V, in turn, debates selected key topics in the 
international climate change negotiations from a EU perspec-
tive. Finally, section VI debates the prospects of continued in-
ternational EU leadership on climate change, especially now 
that the U.S. has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol. 
II. THE EU AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR 
The EU is a sui generis international organization, which 
has been referred to as a "supranational" organization.28 Its 
characteristics are new to international law in that it performs 
certain functions that are traditionally within the realm of the 
sovereign state.29 Notably, it has the power to adopt law which 
has "direct effect" in the Member States, an act of implementa-
tion by the states' authorities not being necessary.30 
mental Politics 139·144 (2001). 
26 See COP-6.5 Report; and Goldberg & Silverthorne, supra note 20. 
27 See COP-7 Report, supra note 20. 
28 HANS SMIT & PETER E. HERZOG, THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Vol. 1, 
§ 1.02 (Publication 623, Release 40, July 2001). 
29 Richard Macrory & Martin Hession, The European Community and Climate 
Change, in O'RIORDAN & JAGER, supra note 3, at 106 [hereinafter Marcory & Hession). 
30 PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAw 163-167 (1998) [hereinafter CRAIG & 
DE BURCA). EC Treaty art. 249 (ex Article 189) (see infra note 31) lists the different 
legal instruments that the EU has at its disposal: Regulations are binding in their 
entirety and apply directly in all Member States. Directives are binding, as to the 
result achieved, upon each Member State to which they are addressed. They leave the 
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A. THE BASIS FOR COMMUNITY ACTION 
The Treaty of the European Community (EC Treaty)31 does 
not contain a single legal basis for Community action in the 
area of climate change. Depending on the nature of the indi-
vidual measures, they have been based on a variety of provi-
sions, including, inter alia, Articles 71 (ex Article 75, Trans-
port), 95 (ex Article 100a, Approximation of laws), 133 (ex Arti-
cle 113, Common commercial policy), as well as on the Com-
munity's environmental competence32 as set out in Title XIX of 
the EC Treaty, especially Article 174 (ex Article 130r). Its 
paragraph 1 provides that community policy on the environ-
ment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives: 
• preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment; 
• protecting human health; 
• prudent and rational utilization of natural resources; 
• promoting measures at international level to deal with 
regional or worldwide environmental problems. 
Paragraph 4 explicitly provides for international coopera-
tion, inter alia through the conclusion of treaties with third 
countries. Its fIrst subparagraph reads: 
Within their respective spheres of competence, the Commu-
nity and the Member States shall cooperate with third coun-
tries and with the competent international organizations. 
choice of form and methods to the national authorities. Decisions are binding in their 
entirety upon the addressees. Recommendations and opinions are not binding. 
31 Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter EC Treaty) as 
amended by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, available at <http://www.europa.eu.intJeur 
.lexfenltreaties/datJec30ns_treaty_en.pdf'> (visited Dec. 11, 2001). As the Treaty of 
Amsterdam renumbered the articles of the EC Treaty, we will cite the old article in 
parentheses. In late 2000, the Treaty of Nice amended the Amsterdam Treaty, but the 
former has not yet entered into force. The Nice treaty has not nonetheless clarified the 
questions addressed in this paper. We will therefore not take it into account in our 
analysis. See, for an analysis of EU environmental policy after Nice, Andrew Jordan & 
Jenny Fairbrass, European Union Environmental Policy after the Nice Summit, 10 
ENVT'L POLITICS 109·114. 
32 The word "competence" is used often by europeans in describing the mandate 
and/or relationships between eu states and the commission, etc. However, the word is 
not typically used that way in the U.S. 
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The arrangements for Community cooperation may be the 
subject of agreements between the Community and the third 
parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in 
accordance with Article 300. 
Article 175 (ex Article 130s) determines the general proce-
dure for the adoption of measures under Article 174, while Ar-
ticle 300 (ex Article 228) contains special rules for the conclu-
sion of agreements according to Article 174 paragraph 4. 
B. EXCLUSIVE VERSUS SHARED COMPETENCE 
One of the features of the EU that most clearly distin-
guishes it from a state is the fact that the EU does not have 
comprehensive competence. On the contrary, it has compe-
tency to the extent that Member States have granted it.33 
In a few areas, the Member States have decided that the 
EU should be solely responsible for dealing with all issues that 
may arise pertaining to that particular subject matter ("exclu-
sive" competence). This is arguably the case, for example, of 
the common commercial, agricultural and fisheries policies, 34 
but not for the field of environmental policy. According to the 
first paragraph of Article 174 (ex Article 130r), which deter-
mines the scope of the Community's environmental compe-
tence, the EU environmental policy only "contributes" to the 
conservation and improvement of the environment. In addi-
tion, Article 176 EC Treaty (ex Article 130t) explicitly reserves 
the Member States' right to adopt more stringent measures 
than those adopted by the Community.35 This is a case of 
"shared" or mixed competence between the Community and its 
Member States. Both entities have the power to take action, 
legislative and non-legislative, in the field of environmental 
protection. The Member States can act insofar as the EU has 
not done SO.36 
33 EC Treaty art. 5, '1 1 (ex Article 3b); CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 30, at 124. 
Further, the Community has legal personality insofar as the Member States have 
conferred competence on it. See EC Treaty art. 281 (ex Article 210), supra note 31; 
P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLoREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 97-101 (1998) [hereinafter KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT]. 
34 CRAIG & DE BliRCA, supra note 30, at 124-126. 
35 Macrory & Hession, supra note 29. at 106, 123. 
36 Agnethe Dahl, Competence and Subsidiarity, in GUPTA & GRUBB, supra note 4. at 
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It is important to note that for areas of shared competence, 
the EC Treaty contains a presumption that the Member States 
rather than the Community should take necessary action.37 
According to the "subsidiarity" principle, the EU takes meas-
ures "only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore [ ... ] be better achieved by the Community."38 This 
principle was introduced in 1987 for environmental regula-
tion39 and, since the adoption of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, is 
applicable as a general rule to all areas of shared competence. 
Subsidiarity restricts the Community's scope of action in the 
environmental field. The debate around subsidiarity has been 
highly politicized, and as a result decisions on attribution of 
competence have primarily been made for political and eco-
nomic rather than environmental reasons.40 In particular, the 
subsidiarity principle has been used to impede the surrender of 
further powers to the Community in the field of climate 
change.41 
EU competence is particularly limited in the crucial energy 
sector. In fact, the Treaties do not contain any formal Commu-
nity competence in this field. Energy legislation has therefore 
been based on the - exclusive - EU competence on internal 
market issues,42 and attempts have been made to take energy-
related measures on the basis of EU environmental powers. 
However, by invoking the subsidiarity principle, Member 
States have frequently managed to retain their sovereignty in 
all important areas.43 As will be shown in detail below (Section 
IV) , EU policy proposals in this field have frequently failed or 
have been considerably weakened. For instance, some Member 
States have, to date, successfully prevented the adoption of a 
203,205 [hereinafter Dahl]. 
37Id. at 203,213. 
38 EC Treaty art. 5 ~ 2 (ex Article 3b), supra note 31. 
39 Former Article 130r (for explanation, see supra note 31). 
40 Ute Collier, The EU and Climate Change Policy: the Struggle over Policy Compe-
tences, in CASES IN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 43, 48 (Ute Collier & Ragnar LOfstedt 
eds., 1997 [hereinafter COLLIER & LOFSTEDT]) [hereinafter Collier]. 
41 See Collier, id at 43, 53-55; Dahl, supra note 36, at 203, 217; Haigh, supra note 3, 
. at 165, 179; and IAN MANNERS, SUBSTANCE AND SYMBOLISM: AN ANATOMY OF 
COOPERATION IN THE NEW EUROPE 74 (2000) [hereinafter MANNERS]. 
42 For an overview see Dahl, supra note 36, at 203, 208, and Collier, supra note 40, 
at 43, 49, 50. 
43 Id. at 43, 49; also Dahl, supra note 36, at 203, 209. 
9
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Community-wide C02/energy tax, which the Commission first 
suggested in 1991. Similarly, the European energy efficiency 
program (SA VE)44 was considerably weakened as a direct re-
sult of Member States bringing the subsidiarity principle into 
play.45 Agnethe Dahl, in analyzing the interplay between EC 
competence and subsidiarity in the climate change arena, was 
led to conclude that the subsidiarity principle has dominated 
the evolution of ED climate policy.46 
C. INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL COMPETENCE 
The internal competences of the ED are paralleled by ex-
ternal powers. Insofar as it is competent to promulgate regula-
tion within the Community, the ED can also enter into negotia-
tions and conclude treaties with other states and international 
organizations. Because Community law preempts Member 
State law, only the ED has the power to accept and implement 
international obligations in areas of ED competence. Where 
the Treaty does not provide explicitly for such external compe-
tences, they are therefore considered to be "implied powers."47 
As stated above, Article 174, paragraph 4 (ex Article 130r) ex-
plicitly provides for an external Community competence in the 
field of environmental policy. 
As the external competence corresponds to the internal 
powers, the split of competences described in the previous sec-
tion also occurs in the external sphere. Article 174, paragraph 
4 expresses this by referring to "[the EC and its Member 
States] respective spheres of competence." This is the reason 
why both the ED and its Member States are Parties to the 
DNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and they both need to ratify 
these agreements. 
The DNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol as well as other en-
vironmental treaties are what can be termed "mixed" agree-
ments. They cover a variety of subject matters - including e.g. 
44 See Section IV.X below. 
45 See Collier, supra note 40, at 43, 55; Dahl, supra note 36, at 203, 216; and Haigh, 
supra note 3, at 155, 166, 175, 179. 
46 Dahl, supra note 36, at 203, 204. 
47 CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 30, at 115·119; Macrory & Hession, supra note 29, 
at 106, 123·125. 
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environmental protection and trade, so that neither the ED nor 
its members have the exclusive power to execute these ac-
cords.48 In theory, only the ED is entitled to participate in ne-
gotiations concerning matters of exclusive Community compe-
tence, while the Member States are entitled to participate in 
negotiations in areas of exclusive Member State competence. 
Both are entitled to participate in fields of shared compe-
tence.49 These areas cannot, however, be easily be delineated 
from one another. This has at times caused the ED members 
and institutions to enter into internal negotiations within the 
context of external negotiations in order to decide who is com-
petent regarding the issue under discussion. 50 On occasion, it 
has even barred the ED from participating altogether. 51 This 
has sometimes placed the ED at a disadvantage compared with 
other actors. 52 
Because the clear determination of respective competences 
is virtually impossible, the Presidency of the Council speaks on 
behalf of the Community and its Member States in climate ne-
gotiations, conveying agreed upon common positions. 53 Since 
such common positions affect in part areas of Member State 
competence, they must be approved by consensus. As a result, 
the process of reaching agreement among all ED members and 
the European Commission can be cumbersome, and can delay 
necessary action and inhibit the ED's capability to demonstrate 
leadership in international negotiations. In situations where 
swift moves are indispensable, especially during the last hours 
of decisive negotiations, the ED's negotiating ability can some-
times be paralyzed.54 In addition, the outcome of these internal 
negotiations is likely to reflect lowest common denominator 
48 Joseph Jupille & James A. Caporaso, States, Agency, and Rules: The European 
Union in Global Environmental Politics, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY (Carolyn Rhodes ed., 1998 [hereinafter RHODES) 213, 218 [hereinafter 
Jupille & Caporaso]. 
49 Macrory & Hession, supra note 29, at 106, 113, 136. 
sOld. at 213, 218. See also Jupille & Caporaso, supra note 48, at 222, further note 
on the UNFCCC negotiations that with the exception of areas of exclusive competence, 
"the EC's authority was rarely clear to anyone, including the EC participants them-
selves." 
51 Id. at 213,222. 
S2Id. at 213,225. 
53 Macrory & Hession, supra note 29, at 106, 136. See also Section III.D.1 below. 
54 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 268; Hermann E. Ott, Climate change: an 
important foreign policy issue, 77 INT'L AFF. 277, 285 (2001) [hereinafter Ott]. 
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positions even before the EU enters into bargaining with out-
side governments (see section VII, below).55 
D. NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
ORGANIZATION 
1. Reaching a Common Position: The Council 
Although the European Parliament's role has to some ex-
tent been strengthened by recent treaty reforms, the Council of 
the European Union is still the most powerful EU body.56 The 
Council is the ED's primary decision-making, legislative, and 
coordinating authority. It consists of a representative at minis-
teriallevel of each Member State.57 In the case of climate pol-
icy, the Council usually consists of the environment minis-
ters.58 The members of the Council are bound by instructions 
from their respective governments, but they are also obligated 
- as parts of a Community institution - to act for the EU's 
common good. 59 
Decision-making procedures and Council voting rules vary 
in different areas of EU competence. Most matters are now 
decided by qualified majority voting.6o In the field of environ-
mental regulation, the procedure of co-decision between the 
Council and the European Parliament, which provides for 
qualified majority voting within the Council,61 is to be generally 
applied. 62 Article 175 (ex Article 130s), paragraph 2, however, 
contains important exceptions that apply when the Council 
55 Joyeeta Gupta & Lasse Ringius, The EU's Climate Leadership: Reconciling Ambi-
tion and Reality, 1 INT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 281 286 (2001) [hereinafter Gupta & 
Ringius]; MANNERS, supra note 41, at 57-58; Bert Metz et aI., How Can the European 
Union Contribute to a COP-6 Agreement?, 1 INT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 167, 169 (2001) 
[hereinafter Metz et all; Accord Jupille & Caporaso, supra note 48, at 213, 219, 226. 
56 Mikael Skou Anderson & Lise Nordvig Rasmussen, The Making of Environmentl 
Policy in the European Council, 36 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUDIES 585-97. 
57 EC Treaty art. 202-210 (ex Articles 145-154), supra note 31; CRAIG & DE BURCA, 
supra note 30, at 57-58. 
58 Henry D. Jacoby & David M. Reiner, Getting climate policy on track after The 
Hague, 77 INT'L AFF. 297, 300 (2001) [hereinafter Jacoby & Reiner]. 
59 KAPTEYN & VANTHEMAAT, supra note 33, at 187-188. 
60 CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 30, at 130 (1998). EC Treaty art. 205 ~ 2 (ex Arti-
cle 148), supra note 31, defines the qualified majority. 
61 EC Treaty art. 251 (ex Article 189b), id. 
62 EC Treaty art. 175, '1 1 (ex Article 130s), id. 
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must act unanimously on matters primarily of a fiscal nature 
and "measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice 
between different energy sources and the general structure of 
its energy supply." 
In the context of climate negotiations, the Council plays a 
key role both in the run-up to negotiations and in signing ana. 
ratifying the relevant agreements. Before a negotiating ses-
sion, the EU and its members meet in Council formation to dis-
cuss and agree on a common position. The fact that the Coun-
cil was able at various stages of the climate negotiations to 
reach agreement on specific internal climate policies, e.g. bur-
den sharing among Member States, has both ensured a com-
mon EU line and strengthened the EU's leadership role during 
those negotiations.63 However, this leadership is sometimes 
much less effective in the "heat" of complex international nego-
tiations, in which a Party is expected to think and act quickly 
(see section VII, below). The EU has often shown a lack of 
flexibility and expedition; it clearly has an effectiveness gap in 
international negotiations on areas of mixed competence like 
climate change.64 
The process of reaching a common position within the 
Council is characterized by bargaining and uncertainty until 
the last moment. Success depends considerably on the leader-
ship exerted by the country holding the Presidency65 at a given 
moment, which in effect has to broker the deal among the other 
Member States and the Commission.66 Mter COP-1 (1995), an 
Ad Hoc Group on Climate Change was established at Council 
level. This EU coordinating group has enhanced the EU's ef-
fectiveness in reaching a common position.67 The group is fur-
ther divided into working groups (as many as half a dozen at 
times) that analyze different negotiation proposals at a techni-
cal level with third Parties and prepare policy packages for 
adoption by the Ad Hoc Group and the Council of ministers. 
63 MANNERS, supra note 41, at 64. 
64 Yamin, supra note 12; and GUPTA & GRUBB, supra note 4. 
65 See infra Section II.D.2. 
66 Historically, smaller Member States have been more prone to reaching consen-
sus-and to a certain extent foregoing their strict national position in favor of an over-
all EU position. Thus has been clearly the case for Sweden and Belgium in recent 
years. Bigger Member States, in contrast, tend to try to impose their own priorities, or 
to broker agreement with other bigger states or influential smaller states. 
67 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 65. 
13
Lacasta et al.: EU's Position on Climate Change
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
364 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
Once an international agreement is reached, the Council is 
responsible for signing and concluding the treaty or agree-
ment.68 Similar to the rules for internal decision-making, the 
Council decides by a qualified majority. However, it must act 
unanimously when the agreement covers a field for which una-
nimity is required for the adoption of internal rules.69 There 
have been arguments over the question of whether the second 
paragraph of Article 175 EC Treaty (ex Article 130s), which 
requires unanimity, applies to the conclusion of climate agree-
ments. When the UNFCCC was adopted, the UK argued that 
it did-in that climate policy affected significantly energy poli-
cies. The Council legal service, on the other hand, held that 
Article 175, paragraph 1 governed and thus the qualified ma-
jority voting procedure applied. The problem was resolved po-
litically when the UK abstained from voting.70 The approval 
process regarding the Kyoto Protocol,71 once again, addressed 
this question. The Council faced intense discussions in reach-
ing an agreement on ratification, because several Member 
States, including the UK (and to a lesser extent France), ar-
gued for the necessity of unanimity. In order to settle the dis-
pute, the Council adopted a declaration according to which fur-
ther national obligations to reduce emissions should be decided 
upon by consensus. It managed, however, to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol by under Article 175, paragraph 1 of the EC Treaty.72 
2. Negotiating Internationally: The Role of Presidency 
The Council is headed by the Presidency, which is held al-
ternately by each Member State for six months.73 The Presi-
dency is assisted by the Commission and the Member States 
68 EC Treaty art. 300 ~ 2 (ex Article 228), supra note 31. 
69 EC Treaty art. 300 ~ 1, subparagraph 2, and ~ 2, subparagraph 1 (ex Article 228), 
supra note 31. 
70 Haigh, supra note 3, at 155, 178. 
71 Commission Proposal for a Council Decision, COM(2001) 579, available at 
<http://europa.eu.int/commlenvironmentlclimat/comlOI579_en.pdf>(visitedDec.11, 
2001). 
72 See 2413th European Council of Environmental Ministers, Brussels, Mar. 4, 2002 
(provisional version). Available at: http://ue.eu.intlen/summ.htm (visited Mar. 5, 2002) 
[hereinafter March 2002 Council]. 
73 EC Treaty art. 203 ~ 2 (ex Article 146), supra note 31. 
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holding the preceding and the upcoming Presidency, these 
three forming the traditional so-called "Troika."74 
The Presidency coordinates the formation of the ED's 
common position and presents it at international negotia-
tions. 75 Its management of the process is vital for the effec-
tiveness of the EU negotiating stance. The Presidency deter-
mines the agenda of the Council, chairs its sessions and coordi-
nates the Member States at negotiations.76 Thus, the effec-
tiveness of the EU in international negotiations is influenced 
by the Presidency's internal management and external negoti-
ating skills and tactics. For example, in the run-up to Kyoto, 
EU climate policy did not progress much during the Italian and 
Irish Presidencies in 1996. While in the first half of 1997, the 
Dutch Presidency drove the process forward significantly, 
which resulted in the approval by the Council of the EU Bur-
den Sharing Agreement, as well as a negotiating 15% reduction 
target by 2010, and an intermediate 7.5% reduction target by 
2005 (see infra, Section V.B.).77 Similarly, German leader-
ship-and insistence-on the matter of using the Kyoto market 
mechanisms as "supplemental to domestic actions,"78 ensured 
that during its Presidency, in the fIrst half of 1999, the EU con-
cluded and presented a negotiating proposal on this matter.79 
In terms of negotiating with third parties, the Presidency's 
leadership is also conditioned by practical and political consid-
erations. For instance, two of the three Presidencies immedi-
74 After the Treaty of European Union and The Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 3, 
the Troika currently consists of the Presidency in office, the Secretary· General of the 
Council, in his capacity as High Representative for the common foreign and security 
policy, and the Member State which is next in line for the Presidency. In the climate 
context, however, the practice has been to use the traditional rather than the current 
Troika i.e. the Presidency in office, the Member State to hold the next Presidency and 
the Commission. See Glossary, available at: http://www.europa.eu.intlscadplus/leg/ 
enlcig/g4000t.htm#t6 (visited Dec. 10, 2001). 
75 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 14. 
76 CRAIG & DE B(rnCA, supra note 30, at 58-59; OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 
66. 
77 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 67. 
78 Article 17 states that Parties' use of international emissions trading "shall be 
supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting [the emissions targets)." 
(Emphasis added.) This language was included upon the insistence of the EU. See 
Joanna Depledge, Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: an Article-by-Article Tex-
tual History U.N. Doc. FCCC/TP/2000/2 (2000) [hereinafter Depledge), at 83-85; 
OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 188-205. See also Section X, below. 
79 See 2178th Council of Agriculture Ministers, Brussels May 17, 1999. Available at: 
http://ue.eu.intlnewsroomlnewmain.asp?lang=1 (visited Dec. 12, 2001). 
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ately before COP-7 (2001)-France and Belgium- adopted 
considerably different coordination and negotiation practices, 
perhaps reflecting the differences in capacities and posture be-
tween a large and a medium Member State. France, which 
held the Presidency during the second semester of 2000, at 
times80 clearly pushed for what seemed like its own domestic 
agenda in the internal EU coordination and watched the UK 
unilaterally enter into tentative negotiations with the U.S. 
aimed at securing agreement between the EU and the U.S.81 
On the other hand, Belgium, which held the Presidency during 
the second semester of 2001, took a more consensus-based ap-
proach internally and relied considerably on the assistance of 
the European Commission (discussed below in Section IIIB) as 
well as on a division of labor between Member States, espe-
cially at the technical level. 82 
The rotation of the Presidency every six months in itself 
presents a problem, because it has not allowed the ED's climate 
policy to develop in a coherent and stable way,83 and has not 
provided negotiating partners with a steady arrangement.84 
This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
III. KEY ACTORS WITHIN THE EU 
A. MEMBER STATUS 
The EU currently consists of 15 Member States,85 the 
greenhouse gas emissions patterns and energy mix and con-
80 Especially during COP·6. 
8! See Michael Grubb and Farhana Yamin, Climatic col/apse at The Hague: What 
happened, why, and where do we go from here?, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 77, 2 (2001), 
at 263·264, available at: www.field.org.uk/papers/pdf/cop6.pdf (visited Apr. 12, 2002) 
[hereinafter Grubb & Yamin]; and Ott, supra note 54, at 277. 
82 Such a technical legal division of labor has, as a matter of fact, been commonplace 
for quite some time, at least since 1995. It derives mainly from the extreme complexity 
of the issues under negotiation (which include the setting of an elaborated set of rules 
on a an international monitoring, reporting and verification regime for GHGs emis· 
sions, as well as an international emissions trading system), a growing sense of team 
work at the technical level, and also the fact that virtually every Presidency lacks the 
capacity to tackle comprehensively and effectively such issues. 
83 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 268; Ott, supra note 54, at 277, 285. 
84 Ott, id., at 277, 285; cf. also Sebastian Oberthiir, The EU as an International 
Actor: The Protection of the Ozone Layer, 37 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUDIES 641, 646 
(1999) [hereinafter Oberthiir 1999). 
85 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
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sumption of which vary widely.86 The disparity in emission 
characteristics, abatement costs, possible impacts of climate 
change, and relative level of economic development in the dif-
ferent Member States presents a significant obstacle to agree-
ment on a common climate policy,87 and to a certain extent pro-
vides an illustration of the climate change discussions at the 
global level. 88 Thus the resulting variations in Member states' 
willingness and capability to reduce emissions (see section V.B 
below). In addition, Member States' readiness to endow the EU 
with further competences varies widely, with the UK in par-
ticular being traditionally euro-skeptical in this regard.89 
Ian Manners, discussing the UNFCCC negotiations in the 
early 1990s, divides the Member States into "lead states" 
(mainly Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark-after 1995 
joined by the new Member States Sweden and Finland),90 "sup-
port states" (primarily Italy and Belgium), "swing states" 
(chiefly Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece), a "veto state," the 
UK (which tended to position itself closer to the U.S. than to 
the EU, although less so in recent years), and France shifting 
from an initial status as a support state to one of a swing 
state.91 It is beyond the scope of this paper to illustrate com-
prehensively the positions of the fifteen Member States with 
regard to the EU positioning on the climate negotiations. Suf-
fice it to say, however, that countries strongly pursue their na-
tional interests at the EU level through Council meetings, and 
at the international level through constant, tacit pressure on 
the country holding the Presidency to uphold the collective EU 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
86 For instance, with the exception of the UK, the EU as a whole and every EU 
Member State are net importers of energy. GRUBB ET AL, supra note 11, at 30. For a 
comprehensive review of Member States and Community's greenhouse gas emissions 
and trends, see Commission of the European Communities, Report under Council [on 
the] monitoring mechanism of Community greenhouse gas emissions, Nov. 30, 2001, 
COM(2001) 708 Final. 
87 Ute Collier, The EU and Climate Change Policy: the Struggle over Policy Compe· 
tences, in CASES IN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 43, 44 (Ute Collier & Ragnar LOfstedt 
eds., 1997). 
88 GRUBB ET AL, supra, note 11, at 30. 
89 CLIVE H. CHURCH & DAVID PHINNEMORE, EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 49, 508 (1994). 
90 These countries are those usually more sensitive to environmental issues in gen· 
eral. 
91 MANNERS, supra note 41, at 60-62. More recently, the UK has adopted positions 
closer to the EU majority, id., at 76. 
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position. 92 However, without the ED's collective "weight" indi-
vidual Member States' interests might simply not be able to 
prevail on the negotiating arena in the face of such sizable ne-
gotiating partners as the U.s., Japan, China or Brazil. In a 
recent statement German Environment Minster Jiirgen Trittin 
has illustrated this point quite effectively: 
In such negotiations, Germany does not act as a nation state 
and can only play an active role within the EU... I don't see 
this as a loss of power of the nation state. On the contrary, as 
far as environmental policy is concerned, it has been extraor-
dinarily useful that the EU speaks with one voice and acts, at 
global environmental conferences like Bonn or Marrakech, as 
a strong nation state. This way, we have been able to con-
tinue the Kyoto Process despite the blockage by the United 
States.93 
B. EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
The European Commission (Commission) has been re-
ferred to as the motor of the Community94 and the guardian of 
the treaties.95 It performs a broad range of important func-
tions, from elaborating legislative proposals to ensuring the 
implementation of European law. It generally enjoys the ex-
clusive right to initiate legislative procedures.96 Unlike the 
Council, the Commission does not consist of Member State offi-
cials, but of 20 independent individuals, one or two nationals of 
92 EU negotiators often feel exasperated by the lack of leeway they are awarded in 
negotiating the EU position. That is because they are essentially tied to the wording of 
the most current Council conclusions, which are by definition starting positions. How· 
ever, the internal EU dynamics at international climate meetings is less than prone to 
rapid changes. That is essentially due to the fact that the EU has typically not fully 
discussed bottom line positions before the start of the negotiations. It thus spends 
most of the precious negotiation time discussing internally rather than trying to con· 
vince other Parties of its own positions and trying to reach agreement. It comes there-
fore as no surprise to repeatedly observe Member States' representatives bickering in 
the media, as was the case after COP-6 in 2000 (Grubb&Yamin, supra note 81, at 263-
4; and Ott, supra note 54, at. 277). 
93 http://www.bmu.de/redenirede_trittinOl1208.php (visited Dec.17, 2001). 
94 RUDOLF GEIGER, EG-VERTRAG Article 155/2 (1995). 
95 For the role of the European Commission, see http://www.europa.eu.intlcommlrole 
_en.htm#3 (visited Dec. 10, 2001). 
96 EC Treaty art. 211, 249-252 (ex Articles 155, 189-189c), supra note 31. In the 
field of environmental policy, this power flows from Articles 175, 251 EC Treaty (ex 
Articles 130s, 189b), id. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/2
2002] EU POSITION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 369 
each Member State.97 It takes decisions by a the majority of its 
members.98 
The Commission is organized in Directorates-General 
(DGS),99 several of which playa significant role in climate pol-
icy (e.g. the DGs for environment, energy, taxation). Because 
of their different functions and clientele-some DGs being 
closer to business representatives and others to environmental 
groupslOO_, agreement amongst them on climate policies has 
not always been easy to reach, especially during the run up to 
the UNFCCC negotiations. lol More recently, in the context of 
the Commission's intra-service negotiation on a proposal for an 
emissions trading directive, DGs Environment, Energy & 
Transport and Enterprise were particularly active in brokering 
an internal Commission deal. 
In other environmental regimes, e.g. the ozone regime, the 
Council has mandated the Commission to conduct the negotia-
tions on behalf of the EU.102 Within the climate regime, how-
ever, Member States could not agree to follow the same proce-
dure. The Council did not grant the Commission's request to 
endow it with negotiating authorityl03 for the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations, because many members opposed transferring 
more competences to the EU level,104 As described above,105 the 
Presidency rather than the Commission fulfills the task of co-
ordinating and presenting the EU position in climate negotia-
tions. As a result, the Commission plays a limited role. 106 It 
participates as equal partner in establishing the EU common 
position, on which it and all Member States must agree.107 
97 EC Treaty art. 213 paras 1, 2 (ex Article 157), id; KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, su-
pra note 33, at 195-196. 
98 EC Treaty art. 219 ~ 2 (ex Article 163), and Article 213, paragraphs 1 and 2 (ex 
Arti~le 157), supra note 31. 
99 For an overview of Commission's Directorates-General and Services, see generally 
<http://www.europa.eu.inticommJdgs_en.htm> (visited Dec. 10,2001). 
100 MANNERS, supra note 41, at 69-70,73. 
101 Id. at 63-4 (2000). 
102 Macrory & Hession, supra note 29, at 106, 112; for a detailed description of its 
role in ozone negotiations see Oberthiir 1999, supra note 84, at 641, 645-646. 
103 Such authorization of the Commission by a Council decision is provided for in EC 
Treaty art. 300 ~ 1 (ex Article 228), supra note 31. 
104 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 66. 
105 See Section I1.D.2. 
106 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 269. 
107 Ott, supra note 54, at 277, 285. 
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The refusal to grant the Commission a negotiating man-
date has considerably weakened EU negotiating capacities. lOS 
While in the ozone negotiations the Commission has facilitated 
agreement among the Member States, the guidance of the EU 
by the rotating Presidency does not provide a stable foundation 
for the process and prevents the development of a medium or 
long term negotiating strategy (see section VII, below),lo9 
C. BUSINESS 
The business community has taken an increasing interest 
in the climate negotiations.110 Early in the process, business 
focused on fighting any restriction of fossil fuel use. The U.S.-
based Global Climate Coalition, a group of multinationals that 
invested much money and efforts primarily in discrediting cli-
mate science, is a prominent example of early business activity 
in the climate regime.111 
In Europe, the Commission's proposal for an energy tax 
faced "some of the most ferocious lobbying"112 the EU had ever 
experienced when it became clear that it would not be a "no 
regrets" measure, as the EU had previously asserted. The well 
organized business lobby, led by the Union of Industrial and 
Employer's Confederations of Europe (UNICE), played a major 
part in the inclusion of a "conditionality clause" in the energy 
tax proposal, which ensured that the measure would not be 
applied unless the major OECD competitors introduced similar 
measures.113 
108 OBERTHlJR & OTT, supra note 3, at 66. 
\09Id. at 286-269; Oberthiir 1999, supra note 84, at 641, 645-646; Ott, supra note 54, 
at 277,285. 
110 Chad Carpenter, Business, green groups and the media: the role of non-
governmental organizations in the climate change debate, 77 INT'L AFF., 313 314 (2001) 
[hereinafter Carpenter]. 
111 Id. at 313 314; Clair Gough & Simon Shackley, The respectable politics of climate 
change: the epistemic communities and NGOs, 77 INT'L AFF. 329, 334 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Gough & Shackley]. 
112 The Economist, May 9, 1992, at 19. 
113 Commission of the EC, Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, 30 June 1992, COM(92) 226 Final, at 4; (for a 
general description of the evolution of EU policy from "no regrets" to conditionality in 
this early phase see IAN MANNERS, supra note 41, at 42-9, 59-60, 63-4, 70; and Jorge 
Wettestad, The complicated development of EU climate policy: lessons learnt, in GUBTA 
& GRUBB, , supra note4, 25-45 [hereinafter Wettestad]. For current UNICE policy see 
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Over time and with ever-increasing certainty in climate 
science, the picture has become much more diverse. Many 
businesses have now accepted the need for action. Some have 
begun developing renewable energy and energy efficiency pro-
grams, set voluntary emission reduction targets and under-
taken emission trades.1l4 Mter British Petroleum withdrew 
from the Global Climate Coalition,1l5 other companies followed 
suit, and the Business Environmental Leadership Council was 
founded in the run-up to Kyoto. This council accepts the scien-
tific evidence of climate change and believes businesses should 
playa major role in finding a solution.1l6 
More recent developments in Europe include the creation 
of the European Business Council for a Sustainable Energy 
Future (e5) in 1996, which is dedicated to sustainable develop-
ment achieved primarily through energy efficiency, renewable 
energy and sustainable housing and transport policies,117 and 
the launch of e-mission 55 in the run-up to COP-6.5, in July 
2001. E-mission 55 called for the adoption of meaningful po-
litical decisions by the COP and entry into force of the Kyoto 
Protocol by 2002.118 Both groups have a substantial number of 
European members.1l9 
D. ENVIRONMENTAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
most of them organized in the global Climate Action Network 
<http://www.unice.org>(visitedDec.11. 2001). 
114 For a detailed account see Carpenter, supra note 110, at 313 314-319. See also 
Gough & Shackley, supra note 111, at 329,334; Gupta & Ringius, supra note 55, at 281 
286; WWF Climate Savers, available at <http://www.panda.org/climate/savers.cfm> 
(visited Dec. 6, 2001). 
116 The Global Climate Coalition closed down recently, possibly attesting to the fact 
that it was rapidly losing membership. See Nature, Feb. 7, 2002, at 567. 
116 Business Environmental Leadership Council, available at <http://www.pew 
climate.orglbelcl index.cfm> (visited Dec. 6, 2001); Gough & Shackley, supra note 111, 
at 329,334. 
117 e5: History, available at <http://www.e5.org/pages/energy.htm> (visited Dec. 6, 
2001); The Sustainable Energy Charter , available at <http://www.e5.org/pages/sec 
.htm> (visited Dec. 6, 2001). 
118 e-mission 55, available at <http://www.solarworld.de/E-Mission-55/frame_indexle 
_index.htm> (visited Dec. 10, 2001). 
119 e5 Members 2001, available at <http://www.e5.org/pages/comp.htm> (visited 
Dec. 6, 2001); e-mission 55 Solution Site, available at <http://www.solarworld.de/E-
Mission-55/solutions/e_home .htm> (visited Dec. 6,2001). 
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(CAN),120 have played an important role in climate negotiations 
from the outset. Their number has increased from 191 accred-
ited observers at COP-1 in 1995 to over 530 at COP-6 in 
2000,121 They have been participating in a number of ways, 
including raising public awareness, e.g. through the media or 
demonstrations; making presentations on specific topics in 
side-events at the COPS;122 providing analyses, research papers 
and comments;123 publishing ECO, CAN's newsletter on the 
negotiating process;124 lobbying and discussing the issues with 
negotiators; making formal interventions during negotiating 
sessions; and assisting parties in drafting legal texts for 
UNFCCC documents. 125 
The role of NGOs in the climate arena differs from that in 
many other fields, in that they have participated as partners in 
developing the regime rather than simply playing the part of 
outside critics. 126 NGOs are part of what has been described as 
an "epistemic community," a network of communities that 
share knowledge about a certain phenomenon and a common 
set of normative beliefs concerning what actions will benefit 
human welfare in this domain.127 As in other fields, climate 
NGOs reflect a heterogeneous universe of stakeholders, such as 
generalist versus specialized/expert NGOs, membership versus 
non-membership NGOs, etc. 
120 See <http://www.climatenetwork.org> (visited Dec. 12, 2001). CAN has a global 
membership of 20 Million people, PETER NEWELL, CLIMATE FOR CHANGE 128 (2000) 
[hereinafter NEWELL). 
121 Carpenter, supra note 110, at 313319. 
122 For reports on some COP-7 side events see Earth Negotiations Bulletin - On the 
Side, available at <http://www.iisd.callinkages/climate/cop7/enbots> (visited Dec. 12, 
2001). 
123 See e.g. Independent NGO Evaluation of National Plan for Climate Change Miti-
gation: Second Review, August 1994, Climate Action Network. 
124 See Climate Network, available at <http://www.climatenetwork.org> (visited Dec. 
12, 2001). 
125 Carpenter, supra note 110, at 313 319-321; for an extensive overview over differ-
ent NGOs see Gough & Shackley, supra note 111, at 329,336-339,341-345. For a por-
trayal of CAN see Matthias Duwe, The Climate Action Network: global civil society at 
work?, 10 RECIEL 177-189 (2001) [hereinafter Duwe). 
126 Gough & Shackley, supra note 111, at 329,329; similar MANNERS, supra note 41, 
at 69. 
127 Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Envi-
ronmental Co-Operation, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 168, 179 
(Volker Rittberger ed. with assistance of Peter Mayer 1993). 
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In Europe, cooperation between governments and the 
Commission and NGOs has been particularly close. Some gov-
ernment delegations even include experts originating from 
NGOs, especially from expert/specialized NGOs,128 In addition, 
Member States as well as the Commission have made frequent 
use of the competence of NGO experts, e.g. by funding climate-
related research projects carried out by NGOsl29 and by dis-
cussing relevant issues with them outside and also during ne-
gotiations.13o For instance, in preparing a proposal for an 
emissions trading directive, the Commission relied on the ex-
pert advice of several European (and American) based NGOs. 
In many areas, NGOs clearly possess advanced technical 
knowledge which several EU delegations lack. 
NGO presence varies in different EU countries. The num-
ber of NGOs listed in the 2000 CAN Directory ranges from two 
(Spain) to nineteen (UK) in large Member States and from one 
in Luxembourg to five in the Netherlands and seven in Bel-
gium, the seat of many important EU institutions. 131 NGO in-
fluence has been heightened by the sensitivity to their de-
mands from the part· of certain Member States. 132 For in-
stance, it has been suggested that NGO opposition to the UK-
U.S. deal at COP-6, which among other elements included the 
possibility of accounting "generous" amounts of carbon storage 
activities for the U.S. and other countries, might have contrib-
uted to the decision of some EU countries to reject that deal, 
notably Denmark and Germany.133 
CAN Europe differs in certain respects from other CAN re-
gionaloffices. While most CAN coordinators are employees of 
regional NGOs and carry out their CAN functions alongside 
128 See List of Participants, FCCC/CP/2000IlNF.2, available at <http://cop6.unfccc. 
intlpdfllopcop6 .pdf> (visited Dec. 11, 2001). 
129 E.g. Oberthiir 1999, supra note 84, at 641: see n. at 641; Jiirgen Lefevere & 
Farhana Yamin, The EC as a Party to the FCCC/ KP: An examination of EC competence 
(1999), available at <http://www.field.org.uk/papers/pdfl2%20ECcompetence.pdf> (vis-
ited Dec. 7, 2001). 
130 On environmental NGO consultation by the Commission in general see John 
McCormick, Environmental Policy and the European Union, in INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANlZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 37 (Robert v. Bartlett et al. eds. 1995 
[hereinafter BARTLETT ET ALl) at 46-47. On the relationship between NGOs and some 
European governments, see NEWELL, supra note 120, at 134. 
131 CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK INTERNATIONAL NGO DIRECTORY 2000. 
132 MANNERS, supra note 41, at 68. 
133 Grubb&Yamin, supra note 81,at 263; and Ott, supra note 54, at 283-284. 
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their regular work,134 and U.S.-CAN currently has one half-
time staff member,135 CAN Europe currently has a permanent 
staff of 7 people. 136 This is partly due to the fact that CAN 
Europe receives government funding137 - while U.S.-CAN relies 
on foundation support -, as well as a practical reflection of the 
fact that, in contrast to the heavy representation of NGOs in 
Washington, D.C., the European NGO community had been 
seriously underrepresented at the seat of EU power in Brus-
sels. The greater number of staff members has enabled CAN 
Europe to engage in substantive work much more than other 
CAN offices, which cannot easily perform such tasks in addi-
tion to coordinating regional NGOs.138 
Other than CAN Europe and a handful of staffers from the 
big international NGOs located in Brussels or nearby, Euro-
pean NGOs are primarily located in the different European 
countries. The local versus regional interaction in Europe con-
stitutes the backbone of NGO activity there. In that sense, a 
strong local presence-in addition to a limited but targeted co-
ordinating presence in Brussels- has over the years contrib-
uted to a high level of NGO pressure in Europe and, arguably, 
higher overall effectiveness139 when compared to other regional 
CAN activities. 140 
134 Duwe, supra note 125, at 177. 
135 Personal interview with Joanna Krinn, U.S.-CAN (Dec. 11,2001). 
136 Staff, available at <http://www.climnet.org> (visited Mar. 5, 2002). 
137 It is not uncommon in Europe for NGOs to receive partial financial support from 
public authorities including the State. This is partly due to the fact that, unlike in the 
U.S., private foundations are less predominant in Europe, and the State has tradition-
ally a bigger role-including a fmancial role-in society in general. 
13B Personal interview with Joanna Krinn, U.S.-CAN (Dec. 11, 2001). CNE staff 
includes energy specialists and a climate policy researcher, CNE Staff, available at 
<http://www.climnet.org>(visitedDec.11. 2001). 
139 See also Axel Michaelowa, Impact of Interest Groups on EU Climate Policy, 8 
European Environment 152-160 (1998). A recent poll confirmed a trend that "Europe-
ans continue to trust NGOs twice as much as government and substantially more than 
corporations or the media." See Edelman PR Worldwide, Second annual survey of U.S. 
and European Opinion Leaders (on file with authors). 
140 Comparing briefly CAN Europe with U.S.-CAN, the latter has focused primarily 
on coordinating those NGOs with offices in Washington, D.C. As a result, there is a 
high level of coordination-and arguably effectiveness-of NGO activity in the U.S. 
capital (Personal interview with Joanna Krinn, U.S.-CAN (Dec. 11, 2001), which is 
primarily aimed at the Federal Government. 
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E. MEDIA AND PUBLIC 
Public attention plays a central role in determining the 
EU's political agenda. High levels of public concern about en-
vironmental problems have repeatedly prompted governments 
to address them, while in the absence of popular interest, they 
are considerably less likely to take action. Arguably, both the 
conclusion of the UNFCCC in time for the Rio Summit in 1992 
and of the Kyoto Protocol were to a large degree the result of 
substantial public pressure. 141 
However, the attitude of the public towards environmental 
policies varies in different EU Member States. It is an impor-
tant element that has influenced the positions individual states 
have adopted in environmental matters in general and climate 
policies in particular.142 The strength of the Green movement, 
which in the 1990s, for example, was strong in Germany and 
rather weak in France, can serve to some extent as an indicator 
of public opinion, and success of a Green Party in elections has 
at times caused a government to change its position.143 
Public opinion is largely influenced by the media. Media 
coverage directs the public's attention to certain issues and 
consequently has a bearing on the government agenda. Since 
the media is the primary source of information on climate 
change for most people, it also shapes the way they perceive 
the problem and possible solutions.144 
In recent years, major media sources have reported on 
various aspects of climate change on a very regular basis.145 
Large numbers of journalists attend the COPs; almost 1,000 
were accredited at COP-6 (2000) in The Hague in comparison 
to little more than 2,000 members of Party delegations. 146 
141 NEWELL, supra note 120, at 70-1, 76, 85-6. 
142 MANNERS, supra note 41, at 70-l. 
143 See NEWELL, supra note 120, at 70 for acid rain; and Oberthiir 1999, supra note 
84, at 641,648-650 for ozone politics, both referring to Germany. 
144 NEWELL, supra note 120, at 71-72; Priya A. Kurian, The U.S. Congress and the 
World Banks, in BARTLETI' ET AL, supra note 130, at 103, 106-107 
145 Carpenter, supra note 110, at 313, 321-5. Lists of recent reports are available 
e.g. in the IISD's bi-weekly news summary "Climate News", available at 
<http://www.cckn.netlclimate_ news.asp> (visited Dec. 12, 2001), and - with a more 
European focus - on the CNE website, available at <http://www.climnet.org/newsl 
news.htm> (visited Dec. 12, 2001). 
146 List of Participants, FCCC/CP/2000IINF.2, www.unfccc.int(visitedDec.11. 
2001). 
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Since COP-3 (1997), newspaper articles have been posted and 
distributed at the conference center and handed to government 
officials,147 providing negotiators with an immediate public 
feedback. On the other hand, media interest fades in the time 
periods between major conferences,148 and the way reporters 
have presented the subject has in certain respects added to con-
fusion and lack of knowledge concerning important aspects of 
climate change. Factual errors, an overemphasis of the find-
ings of skeptical climate scientists, exaggeration of abatement 
costs and a focus on singular extreme events rather than struc-
tural problems have resulted in widespread misunderstandings 
about the science, the causes of climate change and possible 
responses.149 This applies to European as well as U.S. me-
dia. 150 
IV. DOES THE EU HAVE A DOMESTIC CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY? 
151 
A. POLICIES AND MEASURES AT THE EU LEVEL 
The EU has demonstrated itself as a leader on the issue of 
climate change (Section V, below), but how is its domestic re-
cord of accomplishment? This chapter briefly reviews the track 
record of the European Union's climate policy in the last decade 
and its likely course in the next one. We will not focus on 
Member States' climate strategies and policies as this would 
fall beyond the scope of this paper.152 First, the regulatory 
147 Carpenter, supra note 110, at, 313, 319. 
148 See for an analysis of media coverage in Portugal Suraje Dessai, Kevin Branco, 
Miguel de Fran!;a Doria, Climate Change and Media in Portugal: Preliminary Results, 
poster presented at the International Conference on Climate Change: Science, Econom-
ics and Politics, Lisbon: November 3-4, 2000 (on me with authors). 
149 NEWELL, supra note 120, at 79-86 with many examples. 
150 [d. at 69 and references in 68-95. 
151 This section is partly based on Suraje Dessai and Nuno Lacasta, What has the 
European Union Been Doing on Climate Change? (2001) (unpublished manuscript on 
me with autors) [hereinafter Dessai & Lacasta 2001]. 
162 For several analyses of different Member States plans and policies, see e.g. JOHN 
GUMMER AND ROBERT MORELAND, THE EUROPEAN UNION & GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
A REVIEW OF FlVE NATIONAL PROGRAMS, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
2000 [hereinafter GUMMER & MORELAND]; Heather Broadbent, Study of the Dutch, 
French and British Climate Change Programmes, Euronatura Working Paper 1/201 
(January 2001), available at: <www.euronatura.pt> (visited Oct. 10, 2001) [hereinafter 
Broadbent]; Suraje Dessai and Axel Michaelowa, Burden sharing and cohesion coun-
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framework is described, followed by the more recent initiatives, 
including the European Climate Change Program (ECCP) and 
a framework directive for greenhouse gas emissions trading 
within the European Community. 
As explained throughout this paper, EU policy is the result 
of the complicated interaction between various interest groups 
compounded by intra and inter-Member States politics.153 Cli-
mate policies in Europe have traditionally been divided into 
environmental policies and energy policies. 154 By 1998, the EU 
had some of the most progressive environmental policies in the 
world.155 Yet, just as one may consider EU environmental pol-
icy as a success in general, one may call EU energy policy a 
failure. 156 
As explained in Section II, in the absence of a clearly de-
fined area of exclusive EU competence on climate change, it is 
extremely difficult to isolate EU and Member States' obliga-
tions. Furthermore, comprehensive international environ-
mental agreements (such as the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Proto-
col) are not easily related to the system of segregated legal 
bases prescribed by the EU treaties. 
"Initial steps to get climate policy in the EU agenda in-
clude a 1986 Resolution from the Parliament and Communica-
tions from the Commission in 1988 and 1989."157 The Fourth 
Action Program on the Environment adopted in late 1987 and 
covering the years 1987 to 1992,158 made no mention of climate 
change except as a subject for further research.159 Momentum 
tries in European climate policy: the Portuguese example, 3/1 Climate Policy 327·341 
(2001) [hereinafter Dessai & Michaelowa]; Nick Eyre, Carbon Reduction in the Real 
World: How the UK will Surpass its Kyoto Obligations, 1/3 Climate Policy 309-326 
[hereinafter "Eyre"]; and Joachim Schleich et ai., Greenhouse Gas Reductions in Ger-
many -lucky strike or hard work?, id. at 363-380 [hereinafter Schleich et all. 
153 See section IV, above. 
154 See Wettestad, supra note 113, at 27-35. 
155 At its founding in 1957, the EU had no environmental policy, no environmental 
bureaucracy, and no environmental laws. When, in 1973, the EU began systematically 
to address environmental concerns there was little expectation that the environment 
would develop into one of the largest areas of common activity. See Andrew Jordan, 
The implementation of EU environmental policy: a policy problem without a political 
solution?, 17 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING C: GOVERNMENT AND POLICY, 69-90 
(1999)[hereinafter Jordan]. 
156 Dahl, supra note 36, at 203-220. 
157 See Wettestad, supra note 113, at 27. 
158 See EEC Fourth Environmental Action Programme (1987-1992), O.J. (C328) 
7.12.1987. 
159 See Haigh, supra note 3, at 161. 
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emerged, however, when the Council of Energy and Environ-
ment ministers in 1990 adopted a political agreement to stabi-
lize C02 emissions in the ED as a whole at 1990 levels by the 
year 2000.160 Closer to the final stages of the negotiations of the 
Convention in 1992, the Commission proposed to the Council 
the following climate package of measures to be implemented 
within the ED in the coming years:161 
• A framework directive on energy efficiency within the 
Special Action Program for Vigorous Energy Efficiency 
(SAVE) program; 
• A decision on renewable energies - AL TENER program; 
• A directive on a combined carbon and energy tax; and 
• A decision concerning a monitoring mechanism for C02 
emissions. 
We will look at each such measure in more detail in the 
next section. 
B. REGULATORY COMPONENTS: WATERED DoWN? 
The SAVE program was designed to improve energy effi-
ciency within the ED in order to reduce C02 emissions and im-
prove security of supply. The program was actually launched in 
1987, but only in October 1991 did the Council of Energy Min-
isters manage to approve it.l62 At that stage, the program em-
phasized the adoption and implementation of several existing 
Directive proposals on energy efficiency standards across a 
range of sectors from power generation to buildings, vehicles 
and household appliances. 163 But by the time it had been 
160 See European Community Conclusions on climate change. Council of Environ-
ment Ministers, European Community, October 1990. 
161 See Community strategy to limit carbon dioxide emissions and to improve energy 
efficiency, COM(92) 246. Given the Commission's traditional desire to expand its com-
petence, it chose the path of trying to develop a complete and ambitious package of 
measures to be agreed together (See Haigh, supra note 3, at 164. 
162 Decision 91/565/EC (7) established a program to promote energy efficiency in the 
Community (the SAVE program); O.J. (L 307) 08.11.1991, at 34. 
163 It was estimated that the program could lead to emission reductions of about 3% 
in the year 2000 (Wettestad, supra note 113, at 31-32). 
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adopted in 1993, all the legislative proposals had either been 
watered down or removed entirely. SAVE was turned into a 
framework directive merely laying out general principles for 
action to guide Member States' own programs and measures, 
short on targets, deadlines and content.164 Most commentators 
argue that the program failed due to insufficient funding and a 
new interpretation of the subsidiarity principle,165 which led 
much of its regulatory content to be abandoned or severely di-
luted. SAVE is considered to have had little impact on energy 
efficiency in the Member States.166 The few gains achieved by 
the first SAVE program were based on the legislative compo-
nent of the program, which is missing from the SAVE II 
framework. 167 Instead SAVE II, which was adopted in Decem-
ber 1996,168 intends to rely on voluntary agreements with 
equipment manufacturers on labeling and energy standards. 
The SAVE II proposal includes only a modest target to improve 
the overall efficiency on energy use in the EU by one per cent 
over the next five years, and has been subject to significant 
budgets cuts that undermine its ability to meet its self-declared 
goals.169 
The two technology-oriented programs, the THERMIE170 
and the JOULEl7l programs, are intended to bring about a 10-
20 per cent reduction in C02 emissions between 2010 and 2020. 
A recent evaluation of THERMIE indicated that it had made 
an impact on market shares for energy efficiency technology, 
but clean coal funding under the program has been criticized 
by environmental groups for displacing focus on renewables, 
and for making only a small contribution to lowering C02 emis-
sions.172 JOULE and THERMIE have been merged into 
164 See WYN GRANT, DUNCAN MATIHEWS & PETER NEWELL, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
EUROPEAN UNION ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, MACMILLAN PRESS, LoNDON (2000), Sec-
tion III [hereinafter GRANT ET ALl. 
165 [d. Section III and note 5. 
166 Collier as quoted by Wettestad, supra note 113, at 32. 
167 Decision 961737/EC established the new multi-annual SAVE II program to con-
tinue and strengthen the action of the original SAVE program. See Council Decision 
96/737/EC, O.J. (L335) 24.12.96. 
168 The originally proposed 150 million ECU budget of SAVE II was cut to 45 million 
by the Energy Council in May 1996. See Wettestad, supra note 113, at 32). 
169 See GRANT ET AL, supra note 164, Section III. 
170 For the strengthening of existing measures to promote the dissemination of bet-
ter energy conversion and use technologies. 
!7l Focusing on energy research and development. 
172 See GRANT ET AL, supra note 164, Section III. 
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ENERGIE, a subprogram on energy of the thematic program 
"Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development" within 
the EU Fifth Framework Program for Research, Technological 
Development and Demonstration (1999-2002). The ENERGIE 
Program is organized principally around two key actions: 
Cleaner Energy Systems, including Renewable Energies, and 
Economic and Efficient Energy for a Competitive Europe sup-
plemented by coordination and cooperative activities of a sec-
toral and cross-sectoral nature. With targets guided by the 
Kyoto protocol and associated policies, ENERGIE's integrated 
activities are focused on creating and applying new solutions 
which achieve balanced improvements to Europe's energy, en-
vironmental and economic performance and thereby contribute 
towards a sustainable future for Europe's citizens.173 
Established in March 1993, the ALTENER174 Directive on 
"the promotion of renewable energy sources in the EU' followed 
a similar fate to SAVE. Its scope and content were considerably 
reduced and its budget deemed insufficientY5 It contained spe-
cific targets but no substantial tools for implementation. 
ALTENER II was funded with a budget of merely twenty-two 
million ECU (the Parliament and Commission had proposed 
more than thirty million176) for 1998-1999.177 A Commission 
Paper published in December 1997 called for a doubling of the 
proportion of EU energy needs supplied by renewables to 
twelve percent by 2010.178 Opposed by the UK, France and 
Germany, the Council accepted the Commission's target only 
by way of guidance making it a voluntary target for Member 
States.179 Some progress was achieved in September 2001, 
173 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/enlprog5.htm, (visited Mar. 4, 2002). 
174 Council Decision 93/500/EEC on the adoption of a Program for the Promotion of 
Renewable Energy Sources, O.J. (L 235) 18.9.1993, at 41). 
175 See Wettestad, supra note 113, at 32. 
176 [d. at 32. 
177 Council Decision concerning a multi-annual program for the promotion of renew-
able energy sources in the Community (Altener II), 98/352/EC, O.J. (L159) 03/06/1998, 
at 53. 
178 Communication from the Commission: Energy for the future: Renewable Energy 
Sources· White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan, COM(97)599 final. 
According to the White Paper, renewables currently supply just 5.3 per cent of EU 
energy consumption. 
179 See GRANT ET AL, supra note 164. Efforts to promote renewables are also under-
mined by the continued use of subsidies to fossil fuels. A Greenpeace report on 'Energy 
subsidies in Europe' showed that more than 90 per cent of direct subsidies from Euro-
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when the Energy Council adopted the Directive on the promo-
tion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in 
the internal electricity market.180 After more than a year under 
discussion, the Directive was weakened in a number of areas 
compared to the draft Directive released by the Commission.181 
Nonetheless, the adopted Directive requires that the EU 
double the use of renewables in the energy supply,182 The Di-
rective includes indicative targets for individual members' 
states, which will be required to draft and adopt legislation to 
achieve these targets.183 The renewables Directive was clearly a 
positive step, but it is still uncertain how the Member States 
will implement it, since the Directive leaves much scope for 
interpretation. Progress will monitor the Directive's progress 
and may, as a result, make further proposals, including for 
mandatory targets. 
As this brief review has shown, regulatory measures have 
been consistently bogged down either through the principle of 
subsidiarity or lack of funding, both demonstrating overall lack 
of political will to act at the EC leveL Furthermore, poor im-
plementation and regulatory failure remain a problem within 
the EU.184 This gap may partly be attributed to the fact that it 
is the Environment Council that makes climate policy an-
nouncements and other Council formations, e.g. Energy, (as 
well as the Member States) that undertake the implementation 
of relevant legislation. Some of the measures that have been 
proposed to close the implementation gap include making use 
of non-regulatory instruments such as taxes, tradable permits, 
and voluntary agreements. We now turn to those policy m-
struments and analyze the ED's attempt to introduce them. 
pean governments to the energy industry go to fossil fuels. Kirsty Hamilton, The Oil 
Industry and Climate Change 14 (Greenpeace International 1998). 
180 Directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources 
in the internal electricity market, 2001177/EC, O.J. (L.283) 27.10.2001, at 33. 
181 Energy for the future: renewable sources of energy, COM(97)599 fmal; also 
known as White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan. 
182 Article 3 of supra note 180. 
183Id. 
184 See Jordan, supra note 155, at 69. 
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C. THE ENERGy/CARBON TAX AND FISCAL MEASURES: TOTAL 
FIASCO? 
In 1992, the European Commission proposed a Directive 
for the introduction of a tax on all energy products, excluding 
renewables, based 50% on energy content and 50% on the car-
bon content of fuels. 185 The objective was to improve energy 
efficiency and favor fuel substitution towards products emitting 
less or no C02. It was proposed to introduce the tax in steps. 
Mter seven years the rates would have reached 0.7 ECU/GJ 
and 9.4 ECU/C02, equivalent to $10 per barrel. Graduated re-
ductions and conditional exemptions from the tax were to be 
applied for energy intensive firms.186 The tax proposal was es-
timated to lead to a reduction in C02 emissions of around 10% 
ten years after implementation, compared to a business-as-
usual scenario. Depending on the business-as-usual scenario, 
this would imply no growth or a slight reduction in C02 emis-
sions compared to 1990 levels. The tax was intended to be lev-
ied in addition to existing excise duties. 
No agreement was ever reached in the Council, where this 
proposal encountered strong opposition from some countries 
and transnational industry. The "cohesion countries" (i.e., 
Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland)187 could only accept the 
proposal in return for additional structural funding, and 
France argued for a pure carbon tax in order to protect its nu-
clear industry.188 Using the subsidiarity principle, the UK ar-
gued that it would be more appropriate to develop such a tax at 
the national leveJ.189 The tax proposal has been halted ever 
since. The 1994 decision of the Council in Essen does no more 
185 Proposal for a Council Directive introducing a tax on carbon dioxide emissions 
and energy, COM(92)226 final. 
186Id. 
187 The Treaty of Maastricht created the so·called "Cohesion Fund" aimed at financ-
ing infrastructure and environmental projects in those Member States where the gross 
national domestic is less than 90% of the EU average. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain are currently within that threshold, and are thus knows as "cohesion" Member 
States. See Maastrich Treaty, supra note 3. 
188 See Skjrerseth as quoted by Wettestad, supra note 113, at 29. 
189 Hence, the UK's objection to a C02 tax did not concern the idea of fiscal meas-
ures in the climate change package as such but rather tax harmonization at the EU 
level. Taxation for the UK is the responsibility of the Member States (Haigh, supra 
note 3, at 165; Dahl, supra note 36, at 217). 
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than enable Member States to apply a carbon/energy tax "if 
[they] so desire."190 
The idea of a C02 tax has not been abandoned, but propos-
als for other, more indirect avenues have been discussed as 
well. 191 Former environment Commissioner, Ritt Bjerregaard, 
stated publicly that the ED could not avoid a carbon/energy tax 
if it intends to reduce C02 emissions after the year 2000 be-
cause energy prices are currently too low to stimulate im-
provements in efficiency.192 The ED-wide carbon/energy tax 
has the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions consid-
erably, but will probably remain on the "shelf' because of the 
requirement for consensus in ED fiscal environmental policies. 
In the meantime, Member States should address the issue, as 
the DK has done, with the introduction of the climate change 
levy on April 2001. Furthermore the development of a ED-wide 
emissions trading scheme might relieve the pressure from the 
development of taxation initiatives, especially if trading leads 
to significant emission reductions within the ED. 
D. MONITORING MECHANISM FOR GREENHOUSE GASES: SOME 
HOPE? 
The only substantive piece of ED legislation to have been 
adopted by the Council so far was the establishment of a moni-
toring mechanism for greenhouse gases. On June 24, 1993 the 
Council of Environment Ministers adopted Decision 
93/389/EECI93 establishing a monitoring mechanism in the 
Community for anthropogenic C02 and other greenhouse gas 
emissions not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. The moni-
toring mechanism serves a double purpose of monitoring pro-
gress towards the stabilization of C02 emissions at 1990 levels 
by the year 2000, and towards the fulfillment of the Commu-
nity's joint commitments under the .1992 Climate Convention. 
The Decision requires each Member State "to devise, publish, 
implement and periodically update national programs for limit-
190 Haigh, id., at 165-166. 
191 Wettestad, supra note 113, at 29. 
192 See Dessai & Lacasta 2001, supra note 151, at 9. 
193 Council Decision 93/389/EEC for a monitoring mechanism of Community C02 
and other greenhouse gas emissions, O.J. (L 167) 9.7.1993, at 31. 
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ing their anthropogenic emissions of C02."194 The Commission 
annually evaluates the national programs in order to assess 
whether progress in the Community as a whole is sufficient to 
attain the stabilization objective. For the performed evalua-
tions195 under this Decision, the Commission concluded that 
the information provided was still not sufficient to evaluate 
progress towards the Community stabilization target in a satis-
factory way.196 Compliance with Decision 93/389 has not been 
impressive because the annual assessments, a key part of the 
Decision, seem to have been virtually ignored.197 
Decision 93/389/EEC was revised in April 1999,198 to allow 
for the updating of the monitoring process in line with the in-
ventory requirements incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol. The 
amendment strengthened national program requirements on 
policies and measures, which should include (a) information on 
actual progress and (b) information on projected progress. 
Member States are required to submit by December 31 inven-
tory data for the two previous years, any updates of previous 
years (including the base year 1990) and their most recent pro-
jected emissions for the years 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020. As 
many commentators have argued,199 the term "monitoring 
mechanism" does not convey its full potential importance, 
which has taken on a particular relevance with the burden-
sharing agreement under the EU ''bubble'' (See section V be-
low). This mechanism could playa critical role in ensuring 
194 ld. Article 2.1. See also Joy Hyvarinen, The European Community's Monitoring 
Mechanism for C02 and other Greenhouse Gases; the Kyoto Protocol and other Recent 
Development, 8 RECIEL, 191, 197 n.2 (2000) [hereinafter HyvarinenJ. 
195 The fIrst evaluation report, which was issued on 10.03.1994, covers the period 1990· 
1993. See Report from the Commission under Council Decision 93/389/EEC, First 
Evaluation of Existing National Programs under the Monitoring Mechanism of Com· 
munity C02 and Other Greenhouse Gas Emissions COM(94)67 fInal, 10.03.1994 at 6. 
The second evaluation report was issued on 14 March 1996. See Report from the 
Commission under Council Decision 93/389/EEC, Second Evaluation of Existing Na-
tional Programmes under the Monitoring Mechanism of Community C02 and Other 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions COM(96)91 fInal, 14.03.1996, at 1. 
196 ld. 
197 See Hyvarinen supra note 194, at 193. 
198 Council Decision 99/296/EC amending Decision 93/389/EEC for a monitoring 
mechanism of Community C02 and other greenhouse gas emissions, O.J. (L 117) 
05.05.1999, at 35. 
199 See e.g. Haigh, supra note 3; and Hyvarinen, supra note 194. 
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that the EU and Member States stay on track towards their 
targets under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. 
The fIrst progress report under Decision 99/296/EC was re-
leased in November 2000.200 The Commission saw good pro-
gress in Member State's reporting on emission inventories and 
some progress with regard to national policies/measures and 
projections. However, much remains to be done with regard to 
the completeness, accuracy and comparability of the data, es-
pecially those on projections. The report concluded that: 
• The EU's greenhouse gas emissions fell by 2.5% between 
1990 and 1998; 
• The majority of Member States are far away from their 
target paths towards Kyoto; the transport sector being 
the fastest-growing emission sector; 
• "Business-as-usual" projections suggest that existing poli-
cies and measures would at best reduce overall EU emis-
sions in 2010 by 57 Mt C02, taking emissions to 1.4%, or 
at worst 0% below the 1990 level; 
• Additional policies and measures identified by Member 
States are projected to yield further reductions close to 
7% below 1990 levels; 
• Projections have considerable uncertainty because of the 
lack of quantified data on additional measures, lack of 
comparability of methodologies used and uncertainty over 
implementation of the policies and measures.201 
This means the EU as a whole is expected to have met its 
commitment under the .Convention, i.e. to stabilize emissions 
at 1990 levels by the year 2000. However, this positive evolu-
tion is more a "fortuitous" result of the economic collapse and 
modernization in eastern Germany and the unintended conse-
quence of "dash for gas" resulting from the privatization in the 
UK's energy sector.202 The 1999 LandfIll directive203 is also 
200 Report under Council Decision 1999/296/EC for a monitoring mechanism of 
Community greenhouse gas emissions, COM(2000)749, final 22.11.2000. 
201 [d. 
202 Natural gas particular emits less C02 than coal or oil. See GRUBB ET AL, supra 
note 11, at 81. 
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expected to have a considerable impact on the reduction of 
overall emissions. 204 However, compliance with the ambitious 
Kyoto target of -8% will prove much harder for the EU and its 
Member States. The Monitoring Mechanism report concludes 
by arguing that in view of the difficulties that the Member 
States face in meeting their Kyoto commitments under the 
Burden Sharing Agreement, common and coordinated policies 
and measures at EU level will become an increasingly impor-
tant element to supplement and reinforce national climate 
strategies. The Commission has proposed policies and meas-
ures, e.g. on energy taxation, renewables, energy efficiency, 
vehicle emissions and landfills, and intends to intensify such 
ongoing work through the European Climate Change Program 
(ECCP), which is further discussed below. Results from the 
ECCP will form the basis for concrete policy proposals in the 
areas of energy, transport, industry and agriculture and for an 
internal EU emissions trading scheme. 
E. VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS: Is EUROPE GETTING THEM 
RIGHT? 
Environmental voluntary agreements have been empha-
sized in the EU Sixth Environment Action Program.205 During 
the 1990s, they received increased attention as an alternative 
or supplement to traditional policy instruments, particularly in 
the field of energy efficiency. Voluntary Agreements can more 
specifically be defined as "commitments between authorities 
and target groups setting forth environmental objectives based 
on voluntary participation or absence of sanctions as part of the 
commitments themselves.''206 In the EU context, the promotion 
of agreements with industry can be seen as part of the effort to 
broaden participation and the range of policy instruments, and 
thus implement the concept of "shared responsibility" empha-
203 1999/31/EC Council Directive 1999/311EC of Apr. 26, 1999 on the landfill of 
waste, O.J. (L 182) 16.07.1999, at.l 
204 See Christoph Bail, Simon Marr and Sebastian Oberthiir, Klimaschutz und Recht 
(2002) (manuscript on file with authors). 
205 See Wettestad supra note 113, at 37. 
206 See Skjrerseth as quoted by Wettestad, id. at 37-38. 
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sized in the 1992 Fifth Action Program and the 'wider constitu-
ency' proposed in the Sixth Environment Action Program. 
Voluntary Agreements are widely applied in EU Member 
States, but few at EU level.207 Recently, the European Commis-
sion and the European Automobile Manufacturers Associa-
tion208 signed a Voluntary Agreement to reach a 25% reduction 
of C02 emissions from passenger cars by 2008.209 Agreements 
have been reached with the Japan Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (JAMA) and the Korean Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (KAMA).210 Voluntary Agreements, however, are 
not free of problems. Besides the difficulty of separating their 
specific effects from more general societal factors and proc-
esses, Voluntary Agreements are also likely to work best in 
''benign'' conditions; with energy efficiency as a relevant cli-
mate policy example.2l1 As an April 2000 Commission Recom-
mendation noted, "The agreement with the auto industry is an 
interesting development, but it is too early to judge whether 
this was a regulatory breakthrough or a regulatory cop out."212 
F. THE EUROPEAN CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAM 
The Environment Council of October 1999 urged the Com-
mission to put forward a list of priority action on climate 
change as early as possible in 2000 and to prepare appropriate 
proposals in due course.213 In response, the European Climate 
Change Program (ECCP) was created.214 The driving force be-
hind the ECCP is the uncertainty and difficulties Members 
207 For a review of voluntary agreements in Member States, See OECD, Voluntary 
Approaches for Environmental Protection in the European Union (Dec.10, 1998), 
ENV/EPOC/G EEI(98) 29/FINAL. 
208 See ACEA and European Commission, C02 emissions from cars, The EU Imple· 
menting the Kyoto Protocol (1998). 
209 See Wettestad, supra note 113, at 39. 
210 Commission Recommendation of Apr. 13, 2000 on the reduction of C02 emissions 
from passenger cars (KAMA), O.J. (L 100) 20.04.2000, at 55. Commission Recommen-
dation of Apr. 13, 2000 on the reduction of C02 emissions from passenger cars (JAMA). 
O.J. (L 100) 20.04.2000, at 57. 
211 Id, at 38. 
212Id. 
213 Council Conclusions on a Community strategy on Climate Change, Doc. 
11654/99, Luxembourg Oct. 12, 1999. 
214 Communication from the Commission on EU policies and measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions: Towards a European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), 
COM(2000)88 Final 8.3.2000 [hereinafter ECCP Communication]. 
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States will face in fulfilling their commitments.215 Under cur-
rent policies and measures the overall EU emission reduction 
in 2010 will lie somewhere between -1.4% and 0%. The ECCP 
emerged as a means of reinforcing common and coordinated 
policies and measures at the Community level, in the face of 
consistent weakening or altogether dropout of Commission 
proposals. These measures are supplemental to actions taken 
by Member States in the fulfillment of their Kyoto targets. The 
ECCP has taken a multi-stakeholder approach216 in the prepa-
ration of the proposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
scope of the program is limited to achieving the Kyoto target of 
-8%, but in the mid and long-term perspective, the ECCP will 
address issues such as adaptation; international cooperation 
through capacity-building and technology transfer; re-
search/observation; demonstration of efficient; and clean tech-
nologies and training and education.217 
The ECCP established a Steering Committee218 to coordi-
nate six Working Groups: 
1. Flexible mechanisms 
2. Energy supply 




Some Working Groups have sub-groups. The Commission's 
role is to coordinate and facilitate the different Working 
Groups in this innovative integration exercise. The results of 
the "Economic Evaluation of Sectoral Emission Reductions Ob-
215 For a review of some Member State's climate programs, See Eyre; Scleich et al.; 
GUMMER & MORELAND; Broadbent; and Dessai & Michaelowa, all supra note 152. 
216 Which has brought together relevant stakeholders such as representatives of the 
Commission, the Member States, industry and the NGO community. See ECCP Com-
munication, supra note 214. 
2171d. 
218 Composed of all Commission services that take part in the ECCP. 
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jectives for Climate Change" 219 study were used as inputs for 
each Working Group, so they have to be briefly mentioned. This 
EU-commissioned report which identifies a least-cost allocation 
of objectives for different sectors and greenhouse gases, would 
allow the EU to reach its Kyoto target.220 With caveats and 
limitations, the study combines a "top-down" and a ''bottom-up'' 
methodology to understand different cost-effective greenhouse 
gas mitigation options. The study results show that instead of 
having each sector reduce its emissions by 8%, some sectors 
need to reduce their emissions by more than 8%: energy supply 
(11 %), fossil fuel extraction (46%), industry (26%), agriculture 
(8%) and waste (28%). According to this sectoral least-cost allo-
cation approach compliance costs are predicted to be 0.06% of 
EU gross domestic product.221 A number of other studies pro-
vide estimates in a similar range of up to 0.3%.222 According to 
this study the six most cost-effective ways for the EU to reach 
its Kyoto target are: 
1. Decarbonization of energy supply: 
a. Further switching from coal to gas; 
b. More efficient generation of power (e.g. increasing 
the share of Combined Heat and Power); 
c. Increase in the use of renewable energy (notably bio-
mass and wind energy). 
2. Improvement of energy efficiency, particularly in industry, 
households (retrofitting) and services sector. 
3. Further reduction of nitrous oxide from the adipic acid in-
dustry and implementation of reduction options in the nitric 
acid industry. 
4. Reductions of methane emissions in coal mmmg, oil and 
natural gas, and waste and agriculture sectors. 
219 Kornelis Blok, David de Jager and Chris Hendriks. Economic Evaluation of Sec· 
toral Emission Reduction Objectives for Climate Change - Summary Report for Policy 
Makers, ECOFYS Energy and Environment, March 2001 [hereinafter Blok et all. 
220 Id. at 1. The intention was to identify a least·cost allocation so that the cost of 
production of energy and other goods would increase as little as possible. 
221 Had the allocation been done at a Member State level instead of EU·wide, the 
compliance costs would more than double (Id. at iv). 
222 European Commission Proposal for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the 
European Community COM(2001)579 final; 
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5. Reduction of fluorinated gases in specific applications, e.g. 
industrial processes, mobile air conditioning and commercial 
refrigeration. 
6. Energy efficiency improvement measures in the transport 
system.223 
The results from this study served as the basis for discus-
sion of the ECCP Working Groups, which came up with meas-
ures based on criteria of cost efficiency, emission reduction po-
tential, time horizon and political acceptability. Each Working 
Group met several times in 2000 and 2001. The Commission 
was then urged to develop concrete policy proposals that have 
been presented as a package of me~sures in four areas: cross-
cutting, energy, transport and industry (see table 2, below).224 
Table 2: ECCP Policy Proposals 
Cross Cutting Issues 
- Promoting effective implementation of the Integrated Pollu-
tion Prevention and Control Directive 
- Proposal for a Directive on linking project-based mecha-
nisms including Joint Implementation and Clean Development 
Mechanism to EC emissions trading scheme 
- Proposal for a review of the monitoring mechanism 
Energy Issues 
- Proposal for a Framework Directive for minimum efficiency 
requirements for end-use equipment 
- Proposal for a Directive on energy demand management 
- Proposal for a Directive for the promotion of Combined Heat 
and Power 
- Non-legislative proposals: Initiatives on increased energy-
efficient public procurement; Public awareness campaign and 
campaign take-off 
223 Blok et aI, supra note 219, at iv·v. 
224 See European Commission Communication on the implementation of the rll'st 
phase of the ECCP COM(2001)580 final. 
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Table 2 Continued: ECCP Policy Proposals 
Transport 
- Proposal for shifting the balance between modes of transport 
- Proposal for improvement in infrastructure use and charging 
- Promotion of the use of biofuels for transport 
Industry 
- Proposal for a Framework Directive on fluorinated gases 
Without scrutinizing each item individually, the climate 
package is ambitious and worthy of the "leader" of the climate 
regime. Nonetheless; according to the Commission, the emis-
sions reduction effects of these measures are unlikely to meet 
the Kyoto targets, thus the need to examine additional meas-
ures from the on-going ECCP process. Mter a decade of weak-
ened proposals, but at the same time building on them, Euro-
pean climate policy is finally starting to shape up. However, all 
these efforts will be in vain if the Council does not quickly 
adopt and implement these proposals. Only then, will the ED 
be able to show directional leadership, i.e., leadership by ex-
ample.225 
G. THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR AN EMISSIONS TRADING 
DIRECTIVE 
In 1999 the European Commission suggested that the best 
way for the Community and its Member States to get ac-
quainted with the Kyoto mechanisms would be to develop their 
own emissions trading scheme.226 A paper227 on greenhouse gas 
emissions trading within the ED was released in 2000 for 
wider consultation with stakeholders. Ninety comments -
overwhelmingly supporting emissions trading - were received 
from governmental organizations, businesses and NGOs 
throughout Europe.228 The proposal for a framework directive 
225 GUPTA & GRUBB, supra note 4, at 21 
226 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment - Preparing for Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol COM(1999)230, final. 
227 Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union, 
COM(2000)87, final [hereinafter Emissions Trading Greenpaper]. 
228 See <http://europa.eu.int/commlenvironment/documl0087_en.htm seen in 23 Jan. 
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was released just before COP-7 (2001) as part of the EU cli-
mate package. While neither industry nor NGOs seemed fully 
content with the proposal, the Commission appears to have 
taken a middle-ground position, which we briefly describe next. 
Beside providing experience in a scheme that will later be 
used internationally,229 an internal emissions trading system 
will enhance the cost-effectiveness of emission reductions by 
making emission reductions as cheap as possible wherever they 
may occur in the Community. The Commission proposed a cap-
and-trade approach covering heavy industry sectors across the 
EU. This proposal revolves around two key concepts: green-
house gas "permit" and greenhouse gas "allowance." All instal-
lations under the scheme will be required to have permits that 
will lay down monitoring, reporting and verification require-
ments in respect of direct emissions of greenhouse gases speci-
fied in relation to those activities. Member States will allocate 
allowances to all installations holding permits that can then be 
transferred to other companies. "Each year, companies must 
submit for cancellation a number of allowances that corre-
sponds to their actual emissions. If they do not have enough 
allowances, sanctions will be imposed on them."23o The scheme 
will run between 2005 and 2007, before the Kyoto Protocol's 
first commitment period starts. The rationale of using emis-
sions trading is based on the fact that it provides certainty 
about the environmental outcomes.231 However, under this pro-
posal, the Member States rather than the EU will decide on 
initial allocations. The Monitoring Mechanism in conjunction 
with national transaction registries will perform the tracking of 
traded allowances. Only carbon dioxide emissions will be cov-
ered in the beginning of the scheme because they represent 
80% of the Community's greenhouse gas emissions. Penalties 
for non-compliance have also been envisaged: set at 0100 per 
excess tone or twice the average market price during that pe-
riod. 
02> (visited Dec. 9, 2001). 
229 The difficulties that might result from inconsistent systems within the EU offer a 
microcosm of the larger challenge. See Jacoby & Reiner, supra note 58, at 310. 
230 Proposal for a framework Directive for greenhouse gas emissions trading within 
the European Community, COM(2001)581, final. 
231 See Emissions Trading Green paper, supra note 227, at 7·9. 
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Designing an emissions trading scheme is not a trivial 
task, least of all if one is to consider all stakeholder interests 
from a variety of Member States. Member States and particu-
lar interest groups remain divided in the details of this emis-
sions trading directive. 232 
In the previous sections we overviewed some key aspects of 
EU policymaking on climate change from an institutional and 
actors-based perspective, as well as the key developments of a 
"domestic" EU climate policy. We now turn to an analysis of 
selected elements in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations between 
1992 and the present day i.e. between the signing of the 
UNFCCC at the Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) and COP-7 in 
late 2001. 
V. THE EU ON SELECTED ISSUES OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE 
REGIME 
Almost ten years have passed since the adoption of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. A 
full fledge analysis of the climate change regime, even if spe-
cifically focused on the EU track record, is beyond the scope of 
this paper. We will instead focus on key selected areas of the 
last ten years of the negotiations by providing illustrations of 
how the EU positioned itself with regard to such areas. We 
will draw upon the available literature and official documents, 
as well as on our own experience-including multiple interac-
tions with many different participants-in taking part in dif-
ferent capacities in the climate negotiations since the mid 
1990s. Finally, the select issue-oriented approach to this 
analysis will be played in the context of the different chrono-
logical milestones, which the climate change regime has gone 
through. These milestones are summarized immediately be-
low. 
As mentioned in the introduction,233 the UNFCCC went 
through essentially three phases after it was signed. The first 
phase was between the Convention's signature in 1992 until 
232 See for example ENDS daily: "EU states divided over climate emission trading", 
13112/2001, available at: www.environmentdaily.comlarticles/index.cfm?action=arti . 
cleref=11232&searchtext=l!:uistatesdivided&seerchtype=phrase (visited Apr. 12, 2002). 
233 See supra table 1. 
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COP-1 in Berlin, Germany, when Parties decided to strengthen 
the regime. The next phase corresponded to the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations that began in 1995 (COP-1) and culminated with 
the adoption of the Protocol at COP-3 in Japan in 1997. The 
third and present phase of over 4 years corresponds to the pe-
riod in which Parties negotiated the key operational rules and 
guidelines under the Protocol, which were essential for its rati-
fication and entry into force-which depends on a majority of 
55 Parties, including Annex I Parties that account for 55% of 
this Annex's C02 emissions. 234 
Throughout this past decade the EU has remained commit-
ted to push for what has generally been perceived as stringent 
climate change standards,235 somewhat in contrast with its own 
domestic track record, as explained in the previous section. If 
one can summarize the following subsections, the EU position-
ing was predicated on the ability of the Member States and the 
Community to jointly fulfill their target obligations under the 
Protocol. This fact has consistently conditioned the EU posi-
tion, leading it often to renege or soften other positions in order 
to secure its primary objective. The following analysis will fo-
cus on three issues: policies and measures, emission targets, 
and developing countries. 
A. POLICIES AND MEASURES: EXPORTING DOMESTIC 
APPROACHES OR INTERNATIONAL PRETEXT FOR DOMESTIC 
COORDINATION? 
A key element in the EU negotiation strategy leading up to 
Kyoto consisted of a package of so-called "common and coordi-
nated policies and measures," such as a carbon/energy tax or 
energy efficiency standards, to be adopted by Parties.236 The 
EU spent much of its internal discussions and negotiating capi-
tal devising and presenting this package to other Parties. The 
234 Article 25.1 of the Protocol, supra note 6. 
235 See e.g. Dessai & Lacasta 2001, supra note 151; Yamin, supra note 12; and 
OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3. 
236 GRUBB ET AL, supra note_ll, at 65, define "policies and measures" as "any action 
which Parties can adopt, either nationally or internationally, to reduce emissions or 
enhance sinks." 
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policies and measures text that was eventually agreed upon is 
much too weak to be claimed as a EU negotiating success. 
The discussion on policies and measures effectively began 
at COP-1 in Berlin (1995). Due to statements from progressive 
Member States and NGO pressure, the EU managed to forge 
an alliance, the so-called "green group," with developing coun-
tries (minus OPEC237) against the JUSSCANNZ countries. 238 
This coalition paved the way for the adoption of the Berlin 
Mandate, which included the EU proposal to call on developed 
country Parties "to elaborate on policies and measures."239 
To that effect and throughout 1996 and part of 1997 the 
EU went through an intense internal process to prepare sev-
erallists of policies and measures. This proposal was submitted 
in mid 1997, and at its core consisted of three annexes contain-
ing three' sets of policies and measures. Annex I included 
"[mandatory] Policies and measures common to all [OECD] 
Parties;" Annex II ''Policies and measures to be given high pri-
ority by [OECD] Parties and for coordination with other Par-
ties;" and Annex III "National policies and measures to be 
given priority for inclusion in national programmes of [OECD] 
Parties ... as appropriate to national circumstances."240 
This proposal was not, however, further elaborated, thus 
provoking considerable criticism and "irritation" from other 
negotiating Parties.241 In fact, those Parties never showed 
much interest in following the EU approach of binding policies 
and measures.242 The U.S., although initially signaling some 
237 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
238 JUSSCANNZ was an informal grouping of the following like-minded countries: 
Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand. 
After the adoption of the Protocol, with Switzerland dropping out, the remaining mem-
bers plus Iceland, Russia and Ukraine became to be knows as "Umbrella Group." This 
more recent formation is especially focused on a coordinated position around the Proto-
col's flexible mechanisms of joint implementation (Article 6), clean development 
mechanism (Article 12) and international emissions trading (Article 17). See Kyoto 
Protocol, supra note 6. 
239 See COP-I Report, Decision 1/CP.1, supra note 23;. This process was called the 
Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate or "AGBM." Id. 
240 See U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBMl1997/3/Add.1, at 103-123. 
241 Yamin, supra note 12, at 53. 
242 Japan (which nonetheless pres!lnted its own proposal), the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS) and some Central and Eastern European countries in the line 
up for EU membership conveyed some mild, however unsubstantiated, support. In 
fact, the EU's fIrst attempt in 1995 to discuss policies and measures had been "met 
with little enthusiasm." See e.g. GRUBB ET AL, supra note 11, at 63. 
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interest in discussing policies and measures in general,243 came 
out in favor of targets and timetables at COP-2 (1996). (See 
next subsection.) It further stated that it "fIrmly opposed 
mandatory, harmonized policies and measures that would be 
imposed upon us in order to reach our target."244 As a result, 
the D.S. did not submit any proposal on policies and measures. 
In the face of such widespread opposition, why did the ED keep 
insisting on its proposals on policies and measures? Commen-
tators have essentially given two reasons for that fact: the fIrst 
reason is based on internal ED politics, and the second views 
the ED position as a default position in the face of U.S. early 
opposition to targets. 
The fIrst reason is that some internal political issues, de-
spite considerable discussion, remained fundamentally unre-
solved among the Member States and the Commission. As a 
result, some Member States transferred such considerations to 
the international level, in the hopes of attracting some support 
for their views.245 The ED certainly had a long history of policy 
coordination in such areas as trade, agriculture and environ-
ment. However, as explained in section IV above, by 1997 it 
had failed to implement meaningful policies and measures on 
climate change-most notably an energy/carbon tax. As a re-
sult, the European Commission in particular might have had 
an interest in exploring the policies and measures avenue as a 
way to extend its competences on climate change.246 An en-
ergy/carbon tax, which the Commission had kept under discus-
sion,247 required harmonization at ED level and was condi-
tional on comparable efforts by the ED's competitors-e.g. the 
U.S. and Japan.248 This measure, it was argued, would suggest 
243 Which led some EU Member States to believe the U.S. was might be for policies 
and measures rather than targets. See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 105. 
244 Statement of Stuart Eizenstat before the U.S. House International Relations 
Committee, Washington, DC, 13 May 1998, as quoted in OBERTHUR & OTT, supra 
note 3, id. 
245 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 104; and Yamin, supra note 12, at 53. 
246 See supra, section II, and the discussion therein on climate change as an area of 
"shared" or "mixed" competence between the EC and its Member States. 
247 As explained supra in Section II, Under the EC treaty the Commission retains 
the exclusive competence to propose EC regulatory measures. 
248 See for a discussion on the principle of conditionality of the EU proposal of a 
energy/carbon tax, Wettestad, supra note 113; and Manners, supra note 41. 
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international coordination.249 In addition to the Commission, 
smaller Member States also favored the policies and measures 
approach as a way to ensure that their particularly open 
economies would not be comparatively disadvantaged should 
they take domestic action on climate change.25o However, as 
Farhana Yamin sharply observes, analyzing the EU interna-
tional climate change negotiating strategy "the fact that these 
same countries could not get other EU Member States to agree 
internally to mandatory [policies and measures] should have 
alerted them to the difficulty of trying to persuade a more het-
erogeneous and larger number of states ... " Rather than see-
ing itself as a microcosm of the larger group, the EU appeared 
to have thought of the [Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate 
(AGBM)]251 process as having the ability to solve the EU own 
internal problems.252 
The second reason advanced by commentators for the EU's 
insistence on policies and measures is of a tactical nature vis-a-
vis the u.S. in particular. At the beginning of the AGBM proc-
ess the U.S. had not yet signaled a preference for targets and 
timetables. Some in the EU therefore viewed the proposal on 
binding policies and measures as a way to put pressure on the 
JUSSCANNZ in general and on the U.S. in particular to either 
approach.253 However, the EU's continued insistence on poli-
cies and measures even after the United States' announcement 
on targets suggests that the strategy did little more than irri-
tate other negotiating partners while proving ultimately to be 
unsuccessfuL 
The Protocol text does not contain any reference to binding 
policies and measures. Article 2 of the Protocol merely lists 
examples of policies and measures to be taken by each Party 
"in accordance with its national circumstances."254 Article 2.4 
249 The notion of an internationally coordinated carbon tax had been opposed by 
most OECD members and OPEC, even in the run· up to the UNFCCC. GRUBB ET AL, 
supra note_ll, at 67, even suggest that the EU proposal on policies with its taxation 
component was "thinly veiled criticism of cheap U.S. gasoline (a topic of transatlantic 
dispute ever since the first oil shock in 1973) and a red rag to OPEC which viewed such 
proposals as a conspiracy to grab its oil rent revenues." 
250 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 103·104 and Yamin, supra note 12, at 53. 
251 See supra note 239. 
252 Yamin, supra note 12, at 53. See also GRUBB ET AL, supra note 11, at 68. 
253 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 105; and Yamin, id., at 52. 
254 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, Article 2.1. 
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further opens the door for the future consideration of policies 
and measures "coordination."255 
Since the adoption of the Protocol in 1997, policies and 
measures have barely been in the negotiators' attention span. 
This is mainly because Parties were busy crafting the Proto-
col's key operational rules on, e.g., the flexible mechanisms and 
monitoring, reporting and verification of Parties' emissions. 256 
As a result, Parties have limited their activity on policies and 
measures to the organization of two information-sharing work-
shops on "best practices."257 COP-7's decision on this issue 
called for further information exchange activities.258 
B. TARGETS AND TIMETABLES: LEADING ... BUT AS A "BUBBLE" 
Mter the adoption of the Convention and in the run up to 
the fIrst Conference of the Parties scheduled for Berlin in 1995, 
it was up to the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to 
push for additional reduction commitments. It based such a 
proposal on the argument that the Convention's stabilization 
aim would not be sufficient to tackle the challenge of climate 
change and that the fIrst review of the adequacy of commit-
ments under the Convention's Article 4.2(d) should take place 
at COP_1.259 AOSIS thus proposed a draft protocol six months 
prior to COP-1, which called for a 20% reduction of industrial-
ized countries C02 emissions by 2005.260 At that stage the EU 
had no clear common position with regard to the strengthening 
of targets.261 Germany, however, proposed language that called 
for further reductions,262 thereby setting the stage within the 
255Id. 
236 See COP·7 Report, supra note 20. 
257 The first workshop took place in Denmark in April 2000, and the second work-
shop in Norway in October 2001. See, respectively, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTAl2000/2; and 
FCCC/CP/SBSTAl2001/INF.5. 
258 See COP-7 Report, Add. I, supra note 20. 
259 See UNFCCC, supra note 5. 
260 See OBERTHliR & OTT, supra note 3, at 45. 
261 The EU Council of Environmental Ministers of 26.05.1992 had merely indicated a 
willingness to "confirm their readiness to contribute actively to preparatory work ... 
on the review of developed country Parties commitments, and to the early preparation 
of Protocols under the Convention covering specific issues, in particular the limitation 
of C02 emissions." Available at: http://www.environment.fgov.belRootltasks/atmos 
pherelklim/pub/eulmain_en.htm (visited 12.12.01). 
262Id. 
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ED. At COP-1 Parties concluded that the Convention's aim 
was not adequate. They decided to set up the AGBM to 
strengthen developed countries' (Annex I) commitments, in-
cluding by means of "quantified limitation and reduction com-
mitments within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 
2020 ... "263 
Although the ED submitted a "proposal on the structure of 
a protocol or another legal instrument,"264 in late 1995, it was 
caught in "stymied"265 internal discussions on the relationship 
between policies and measures (see previous section) and tar-
gets for most of the AGBM. It took a German proposal in Octo-
ber 1995, with the support of a few other Member States, for a 
10% reduction of C02 emissions by 2005 and a 15-20% reduc-
tion by 2010,266 as well as the D.S. coming forward with its po-
sition on targets at COP-2 (1996),267 for the ED to come to an 
agreement on a collective proposal in March 1997. This pro-
posal called for developed country's targets and timetables 
based on a basket of three gases (carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide)268 and on a flat rate reduction of 15% by 2010 in 
relation to the 1990 base year.269 
As stated above, the ED has, during the negotiations of 
targets, insisted on being permitted to fulfill its obligations 
jointly - or as a ''bubble.'' This means that the EU and its 
Member States have a common target (Parties in the end 
agreed upon a reduction of 8%), but that they can redistribute 
the burden of emissions reductions among themselves by 
263 See Report of COP-I, Decision lICP.1, supra note 23. 
264 See U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBMl1996/MISC.2, at 18-25. 
265 See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 51. 
266 The timetables in this proposal had been previously agreed with the EU. Id. at 
116. See also U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBM/1996IMISC.2, at 13-18. 
267 At COP-2 the U.S. conceded on taking "binding" targets. See Speech by Timothy 
Wirth, Under Secretary of Global Mfairs, as quoted by OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 
3, at 52 
268 Whereas other Parties like the U.S. were pushing for comprehensive coverage i.e. 
one that included six rather than three GHGs, the EU was patently divided on this 
issue. Countries like Germany, France and Austria had favored a partial basket of 
gases. The UK and the Netherlands, on the other hand, were in favor of a comprehen-
sive approach. See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 120-126. 
269 See 1990th European Council of Environmental Ministers, Brussels, Mar. 3, 1997 
[hereinafter March 1997 Council]. The June 1997 Council further proposed a 7.5% 
reduction for 2005 for the same basket of gases. See 2017th European Council of Envi-
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means of an internal agreement (the "Burden Sharing Agree-
ment;" see below). 
Although developing countries supported the EU proposal 
on targets,270 this approach drew considerable criticism from 
JUSSCANNZ Parties, in particular Japan and Australia, which 
considered it "unfair" because it was rooted on the possibility of 
internal differentiation (thus flexibility)271 while at the same 
time calling for a single target at the international level,272 
Nonetheless, Farhana Yamin considers that, despite individual 
proposals from Member States, "it was the collective voice of 
the EU that forced [JUSSCANNZ] countries to take this target 
position seriously" and that it "represented the pinnacle of the 
EU leadership" in the Kyoto negotiations.273 
Whereas the EU secured its main objectives of having 
binding targets for developed countries alongside with the pos-
sibility of it being able to combine its aggregate targets into a 
"bubble," on nearly every other issue regarding targets the 
EU's preferred proposal was effectively rejected. Except with 
regard to the fact that the targets were ultimately differenti-
ated among developed countries274 (an approach favored e.g. by 
Australia),275 and that Parties chose 1990 as the year upon 
which reduction should be based276 (a EU preference),277 the 
270 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 118. 
271 France for one favored differentiated targets due to its reliance on nuclear energy 
and, consequently, low per capita emissions. See U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBM/1997IMISC.I, 
at 22. 
272 See Yamin, supra note 12, at 55; OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 116; and 
GRUBB ET AL, supra note_11, at 84-86. 
273 Yamin, id; and GRUBB ET AL, id. at 87. 
274 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note_6, Annex B. 
275 The EU spent most if its negotiating time either discussing among itself or talk-
ing to the U.S. and Japan. Consequently, it paid less attention to the concerns of coun-
tries with Economies in Transition (EITs), in particular those which were deemed to 
join the EU in the mid-term. According to OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 129-130 
" ... there can be little doubt that the Polish and Hungarian commitments [-4%) would 
look different if the EU had been more proactive in its diplomatic efforts towards 
[those) countries .... " 
276 Kyoto Protoccol, supra note_6, Article 3.1. 
277 The EU's insistence on 1990 as the base year (although somewhat against the 
stated opinion of France), constituted a strategic objective for the EU. A later base 
year would have put the EU in disadvantage by rewarding those countries that had not 
limited their emissions since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992. See GRUBB ET AL, 
supra note_11, at 72. However, not all gases covered by the Protocol are subject to the 
1990 base year. In fact, Parties "may use" 1995 as the base year for the so-called "in-
dustrial gases" (hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur haxafluoride). See 
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bulk of the target's design features were instead U.S. propos-
als-such as a comprehensive coverage of six gases rather than 
three.278 In addition, there is no interim target for 2005.279 
Furthermore, rather than being based on a single year assess-
ment, the targets are assessed on the basis of a five year280 
''budget'' or "commitment" period commencing in 2008.281 
1. The Burden Sharing Agreement and Article 4 of the 
Kyoto Protocol 
The issue of ''burden sharing" has been historically at the 
center of the EU position on climate change.282 Already during 
the UNFCCC negotiations, the EU had announced it would 
implement its commitments jointly.283 However, after the en-
try into force of the Convention and perhaps because of the 
non-binding nature of its stabilization goal, EU climate policy 
moved slowly. It was only in the run up to Kyoto, in March 
1997, that the EU managed to come to an internal agreement 
on burden sharing.284 Negotiated under the Dutch Presi-
dency,285 this internal agreement contrasted with the EU's own 
Kyoto Protocol, supra note_6, Article 3.8. This was mainly to accommodate industrial 
bases' concerns in Europe and Japan. See GRUBB ET AL, id., at 75-76. 
278 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note_6, Annex A. The wider the coverage of gases the 
greater the flexibility in reaching one's target. That is why the U.S. favored a six gas 
coverage rather than a 3 gas coverage. By COP-3 the U.S. had also decided to accept 
differentiated. See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 119 and 128; and GRUBB ET 
AL, id. at 69, 72-76. 
279 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, Article 3.2, which merely calls for each Party to 
have made by 2005 " .. . demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments under 
th[e] Protocol." (emphasis added.) 
280 The EU then tried to have it commence in 2003-2007 but it failed. See 
OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 126. 
281 Kyoto Protocol, supra note_6, Article 3.1. 
282 MANNERS, supra note 41. 
283 It had· thus interpreted the language in article UNFCCC 4.2(b), supra note, 5, 
allowing Parties to meet their commitments "individually of jointly." For an illustra-
tion of the EU position on joint fulfilment in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, 
See Daniel Bodansky, The History of the Climate Change Regime, in SPRINZ & 
LUTERBACHER, supra note 10, at 33. 
284 March 1997 Council, supra note 269. 
285 The Burden Sharing Agreement of 1997 was based on a proposal prepared by a 
team of researchers from Utrecht University in the Netherlands. See K. Blok, G.J.M. 
Phylipsen, and J.W. Bode, The triptique approach: burden differentiation of C02 emis-
sion reduction among European Union Member States, Utrecht University, Utrecht, 
1997. For a detailed account of the burden sharing negotiations, see Lasse Ringius, 
Differentiation, leaders and fairness: negotiating climate commitments in the European 
Community, 4 International Negotiation 133-166 (1999). 
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proposal of a 15% reduction described above. In fact, the 1997 
Burden Sharing Agreement would only accomplish a 9% reduc-
tion, with Member States' limitations or reductions ranging 
from -25% to +40% (see table 3, below). 
It hence came as no surprise that this agreement had to be 
renegotiated after the Protocol's adoption, which mandates an 
8% reduction for the EC and the Member States. This time 
under a British Presidency in 1998, the ED renegotiated the 
Burden Sharing Agreement to meet the Kyoto targets, ''but 
ultimately the decision was political."286 With the prospect of 
locking in specific individual targets, the collective ambition at 
COP-3 (1997) gave way to the positions of the more conserva-
tive Member States. Indeed, as Oberthiir and Ott summarize 
in a characteristic illustration of the relationship between the 
Member States in the climate arena: 
... [A] number of governments used the new situation to 
achieve a general relaxation of their targets. Denmark and 
Germany demanded adjustments and the former "green" 
countries Austria and the Netherlands admitted that they 
would not be able to meet their ambitious targets of the first 
agreement. These announcements triggered distinctive resis-
tance from Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, who were 
now expected to limit their emission growth to a larger extent 
than formerly agreed. Of the main emitters of the [EU], only 
the UK declared that it would take a stronger commitment 
than before.287 
Table 3: EU 1997 and 1998 Burden Sharing Agreements 





286 See Dessai & Michaelowa, supra note 152. 
287 See OBERTHOR & OTT, supra note 3, at 147. 






289 2106th European Council of Environmental Ministers, Luxembourg, 16 June 
1998. Available at: 
http://www.environment.fgov.belRootltasks/atmospherelklimlpub/eulmain_ 
(visited October, 1, 2002). 
en.htm 
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Table 3 Continued: EU 1997 and 1998 Burden Sharing 
Agreements 
Member State 1997 1998 
France 0% 0% 
Germany -25% -21% 
Greece +30% +25% 
Ireland +15% +13% 
Italy -7% -6.5% 
Luxemboul'g -30% -28% 
Netherlands -10% -6.0% 
Portugal +40% +27% 
Spain +17% +15% 
Sweden +5% +4.0% 
United Kingdom -10% -12.5% 
EUTOTAL -9.2% -8% 
The 1998 burden sharing thus settled the scores after 
Kyoto and allowed the EC and the Member States to focus on 
the development of their own implementation plans, which 
have indeed been under way ever since.29o 
The issue of burden sharing is intrinsically linked with a 
key provision in the Protocol: Article 4, also known as the 
"joint fulfillment" provision. This article was established es-
sentially to a~commodate the possibility that the EU and its 
Member States would implement their targets jointly or as a 
''bubble'' and, as said, constituted a cornerstone of the EU nego-
tiating position. Some commentators have argued that the Ar-
ticle 4 negotiations undercut somewhat the EU's negotiating 
positions on other matters, where the EU had to give in so as to 
secure agreement on joint fulfillment.291 Another price to pay 
290 At the date of this writing virtually every Member State had either adopted its 
climate plan, or had developed a first draft of such a plan. See Sebastian Oberthiir & 
Dennis Tiinzler, International Regimes as a Trigger of Policy Diffusion: The Develop-
ment of Climate Policies in the European Union, Annex 1 (Feb. 2002) (manuBcript on 
file with Authors). For analyses of several plans, see GUMMER & MORELAND; Broad-
bent; Dessai & Michaelowa; Eyre; Schleich et aI, all supra note 152. See also links to 
Member States' climate web sites at: http://www.europa.eu.intlcommlenviromentlcli-
matllinks.htm (visited Dec. 10, 2002). 
291 See Yamin, supra note 12, at 56-57. 
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for this article was that it contains several features that were 
not EU proposals. 292 First, it allows for the possibility that 
Parties other than the EU (a so-called regional economic and 
integration organization-REIO, like the North American Free 
Trade Agreement293) may also enter into a bubble agreement.294 
Secondly, the bubble agreement must remain unchanged from 
the time of ratification of the Protocol until the end of the 
commitment period.295 Thirdly, and most importantly, the 
bubble that will be applicable to the EU contains a provision on 
individual and joint responsibility between the REIO and its 
members. According to Article 4.6 of the Protocol, "in the event 
of failure to achieve the total combined level of emissions reduc-
tions,"296 both each non-complying bubble member and the 
bubble itself are responsible for such "combined" target. 
C. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Traditionally, the EU has taken a different approach to 
developing country participation in the climate regime, when 
compared to other OECD developed countries. Notably, the 
U.S. and Australia have argued that the larger developing 
countries should take on targets or limitations during the 
Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period. This was clearly ex-
pressed in the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution by the U.S. Senate, 
which required that any agreement signed by the U.S. should 
have meaningful participation by key developing counties in 
292 For an analysis of the Article 4 negotiations, see Depledge, supra note 78, at 57-
59. 
293 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexi-
can States, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). 
294 See Article 4.1, 2, 3 and 5 of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6. However, Parties 
new that the EU would be the only REIO using this article in the foreseeable future. 
In fact, the EU is the only REIO with at a developed enough stage of integration (far 
beyond "economic" in fact) to be able to effectively enforce-via e.g. the European Court 
of Justice-the joint responsibility obligation under Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
295 [d. Article 4.2 and 4.3. The EU had proposed that the Burden Sharing Agreement 
be changed up until "five years before the expiration of the [commitment] period." This 
would have allowed the EU to change the agreement right before the start of the first 
commitment period, in 2008, so as to take on board the expcted new Member States of 
Central and Eastern Europe. See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 144. See also 
Depledge, supra note 78,at 57-59. 
296 Emphasis added. 
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the same commitment period, while not harming the U.S. econ-
omy.297 
The EU, on the other hand, has taken a much more con-
ciliatory position with respect to developing countries commit-
ments. In the run-up to Kyoto, the EU supported the G-
77/China's opposition to new commitments for developing coun-
tries, in line with the Berlin Mandate in fact. 298 Instead, the 
EU argued for a "graduation" - which would include in the 
countries taking on commitments those developing countries 
that had joined the OECD, like South Korea and Mexico - and 
"evolution" - because regulation of developing countries emis-
sions in the long term is an environmental necessity.299 Accord-
ing to Farhana Yamin, the EU was unable to explain their pro-
posals (which were somewhere between the U.S. and its allies 
and the G77/China) to developing countries, who rejected them 
as soon as they heard mention of new commitments.30o The EU 
proposal for developing countries is fairly consistent with its 
own ''bubble'' concept, where more capable states take on 
higher emissions cuts (e.g. Germany) while the less developed 
(e.g. Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland) are allowed to in-
crease their emissions. In their view, similar principles can be 
applied to the climate regime as a whole in the future. Indeed, 
the EU bubble will surely bring a good deal of insight into 
global burden sharing for future commitment periods. 
Mter Kyoto, the EU's relationship with developing coun-
tries has been mixed. Sometimes it has supported Umbrella 
Group positions, other times G77/China positions, and probably 
most of the time somewhere in between. However, after the 
U.S. Bush administration rejected further negotiations over the 
Kyoto Protocol, the EU speedily arranged support from 
G77/China. The EU/G77 coalition was crucial for the success of 
297 See Byrd·Hagel Resolution, Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the 
conditions for the United States becoming a signatory to any international agreement 
on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 105th Congress 1st Session S. RES. 98. (July 25, 1997), available at: 
http://www.nationalcenter.orglKyotoSenate.html(visitedDec.10. 2001). 
298 See Yamin, supra note 12, at 62-64; and Lacasta & Barata, supra note 11, at 124-
125. 
299 See GRUBB ET AL, supra note 11, at 108-11!' 
300 Yamin, supra note 12, at 124-125. Developing Countries fear that the developed 
countries might convert the climate change regime into a vehicle that will prevent 
them from growing economically. 
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the Bonn meeting in the summer of 2001 at COP-5.301 Accord-
ing to some commentators, Europe has bred a polity that is far 
less dominated by the fossil-fuel cartel and far more open to the 
logic of a new North/South deal, when compared to the U.S. 
This was noticeably apparent when the EU and a few other 
developed nations pledged to contribute 0450 million annually 
by 2005 (with this level to be reviewed in 2008) for developing 
countries climate change activities, while the U.S., Australia 
and Japan remained silent.302 
It is important to consider whether this coalition will hold, 
strengthen or collapse altogether in the near future. The Mar-
rakech conference already saw some weakening of the coalition, 
with the EU caving in to many Umbrella demands, much to the 
dislike of G77/China. However, with the discussion on second 
commitment period targets nearing, the EU will surely have to 
take a leadership and mediating role in order to "keep the fam-
ily together." This will be one of the biggest challenges the EU 
faces in the years to come (see section VII, below). 
VI. THE EU AS A LEADER ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ASPIRATION OR 
REALISM? 
A. OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP PROPOSALS 
The sections above have given a mixed picture of the EU's 
ability to pursue a leadership role in climate change policy. In 
Sections II and III we saw that, despite favorable conditions in 
the EU in terms of public and business support, the EU institu-
tional machinery in areas of shared or mixed competence has 
constrained the Union's ability to both implement meaningful 
domestic policies (section IV) and prepare and present an effec-
tive external negotiating position. In Section V we reviewed 
the EU's performance on selected issues of the international 
climate negotiations. Although by no means exhaustive, such 
301 See Tom Athanasiou and Paul Baer, Bonn and Genoa: a tale of two cities and two 
movements, Foreign Policy in Focus (Aug. 2001), available at: http://www.foreignpolicy-
infocus.org/ (visited 17.11.01). The EU/G77 coalition was unable to break the Umbrella 
group though, even with a silent U.S. 
302 See Suraje Dessai and Nuno S. Lacasta, The Marrakech Accords: 
Saving or Sinking the Kyoto Protocol?, Euronatura Working paper 112002 (unpublished 
manuscript on file with authors)[hereinafter Dessai and Lacasta 2002]. 
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exercises allowed us to realize that the EU can be a powerful 
force in the negotiations and that many key elements in the 
Kyoto Protocol were either EU proposals or, as a result of EU 
positions, were not considerably watered down by others. We 
also identified the existence of a paradox according to which 
the EU-and several of its Member States-consistently 
pushed for progressive elements in the agenda, whereas the 
U.S. drove the thinking on the specific elements of the negotia-
tions. As a result, the key architectural elements in the Kyoto 
Protocol are all U.S. ideas. In this concluding section we will 
review key ways that Europe may continue leading on climate 
change, with a view to discerning from recent trends the way 
forward. 
Among the climate policy literature, two proposals have 
emerged on the issue of European leadership. The fIrst pro-
posal was presented in 1999 by two German researchers, 
Sebastian Oberthiir and Herman Ott.303 The second proposal 
was headed by Joyeeta Gupta and Michael Grubb in 2000, and 
was part of a comprehensive research project on this very sub-
ject.304 Both proposals are complementary and we shall there-
fore focus on their common elements and apply them to the 
practice of the EU for the past year. 
These proposals call for a decisive stance from Europe, in 
particular but not exclusively the EU,305 on climate change. 
They are predicated on the central notion that the U.S. (or oth-
ers like Japan or the G77) will not exercise leadership, and that 
the EU is the only major player with both the will and the ca-
pacity to muster the resources to move the process forward. 
The key common elements of these proposals are thus: 
• Ensuring ratification and entry into force of the Kyoto 
Protocol, even without the U.S. initially. The core ele-
ments of this strategy include forging a common under-
standing with Japan and Russia in particular, but also 
with other Parties, so as to ensure the majority needed 
for the entry into force of the Protocol without the U.S.;306 
303 For a review of this proposal, see OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3. 
304 See GUPI'A & GRUBB, supra note 4. 
305 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 301, termed it a "leadership initiative." 
306 GUPI'A & GRUBB, supra note 4, at 309; and OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 
303-305. 
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• Implementing domestic policies and measures (at EU and 
Member States' levels), so as to lead "by example." In ad-
dition to demonstrating that the EU was "putting its 
money where its mouth was," this element would argua-
bly pave the way to international coordination of policies 
and measures, but this time from a bottom-up process;307 
and 
• Strengthen relations and common strategies with devel-
oping countries. This approach would rely on increased 
capacity building support, as well as on ways to ''bridge 
the gap between [the developing countries] and the 
U.S."308 
Gupta and Grubb further add the following elements: 
• First, the EU needs to develop a ''better diplomatic modus 
operandi to ensure that its total influence is united, flexi-
ble, effective and wide in its outreach."309 To that end, 
the authors argue, the EU should focus its energies on 
devising common implementation and negotiating strate-
gies, whereas their implementation should be left primar-
ily to the Member States. With regard to international 
negotiations in particular, the authors recommend that 
the EU and the Member States effectively use their im-
pressive combined diplomatic resources. In particular, 
Member States should have clearly stated roles, including 
greater authority to speak. This fact alone would en-
hance the projection of the EU's arguments. 
• Second, the EU and the Member States need to deploy 
comprehensive public education and outreach campaigns. 
This is especially relevant in the context of the specific 
307 OBERTHUR & OTT, id. at 305·308; and GUPTA & GRUBB, id. Oberthur and Ott 
suggest that in the process of building a coalition for entry into force with like· minded 
countries, the EU should also coordinate a "limited set of [policies and) measures," such 
as in the fields of fiscal policy; research and development on renewables and energy 
efficiency; dismantling of perverse subsidies; energy efficiency standards; and public 
procurement. Id. 
308 GUPTA & GRUBB, id. at 310; and OBERTHUR & OTT, id., at 309-31. See also the 
discussion in section V supra on developing countries. 
309 GUPTA & GRUBB, id. 
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"sacrifices" that will be required in order to implement 
domestic policies and measures.310 
409 
Are these proposals, both dating back two or three years, 
already outdated by the pace of events? Quite the contrary. 
The U.S. pull out of Kyoto only reinforced all the elements in 
the leadership proposals reviewed, and during the last year 
several-although by no means all-elements of those strate-
gies were clearly visible on the part of the European Union. 
The next section presents some examples. 
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LIGHT OF THE LEADERSHIP 
ELEMENTS: FROM THE HAGUE TO MARRAKECH 
Shortly after the U.S. withdrawal from the Protocol, the 
EU sent a letter to the White House emphasizing that a global 
strategy to tackle climate change is an integral part of its rela-
tions with the United States. European Commission President 
Romano Prodi and Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, 
whose country held the EU presidency at the time, signed the 
joint letter that challenged the United States to find the "politi-
cal courage" to come to an agreement on the Protocol's opera-
tional rules, at talks due to take place in Bonn in July 2001.311 
A series of transatlantic letters and diplomatic endeavors fol-
lowed to try to keep the U.S. engaged.3l2 This shuttling of offi-
cials confirmed the rise of climate change as yet another con-
troversial area of transatlantic foreign policy. 
As European leaders realized that the U.S. had decisively 
disengaged from the international climate talks, EU environ-
ment ministers pledged to pursue ratification of the Protocol 
with or without the U.S.313 In addition, demonstrating flexibil-
ity it had lacked at COP-6,3l4 the EU signaled its willingness to 
renegotiate parts of the Protocol in order to accommodate U.S. 
31°Id. at 310. 
311 "EU Tells Bush Climate Is Key to EuropefU.S. Ties," Reuters (Mar. 23, 2001). 
312 "Bush Urges U.S. Partnership with EU in Fighting Problem of Global Warming," 
BNA·Intl. Env. Reporter, vol. 24, No.13, at 500 (June 20, 2001). 
313 "Kyoto accord may be ratified without U.S. - Germany," Reuters News Service 
(Mar. 15, 2001). "'Maybe it will be necessary to ratify the Protocol without the U.S. and 
to instead pave the way for them to join later,' Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes, director gen-
eral at the environment ministry told Reuters at a conference in Leipzig." 
314 See Grubb & Yamin, supra note 81; and Ott, supra note 54, at 283-84. 
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concerns,315 but the administration had simply dug itself too 
deeply to contemplate any adjustment to its withdrawal. The 
EU hence started gathering support for the Kyoto Protocol 
around the world. A European delegation visited Moscow, Te-
hran (Iran led the G77 at the time), Beijing and Tokyo.316 
At COP-6.5, in Bonn, the EU showed extensive negotiating 
flexibility. As a result, a political agreement (the Bonn Agree-
ment) was brokered among the Parties.317 According to the EU 
the Kyoto Protocol was saved. A bitter sweet feeling was none-
theless evident in some EU quarters as they were reminded 
that the terms of the Bonn Agreement are really not so much 
. different-perhaps even less stringent in some areas-than the 
agreement almost reached at COP-6, at the end of 2000.318 
However, the stakes in 2001 were considerably different than 
those of 2000, in that now it was the Protocol's own survival 
that was at issue due to the U.S. withdrawal. In that respect, 
the EU managed to pull together a coalition of like-minded 
countries to secure agreement conducive to the Protocol's entry 
into force. That coalition-although at times bitter-persisted 
at COP-7, in November 2001. At COP-6.5 and COP-7 the EU 
appeared somewhat less under a reclusion mode, having en-
gaged in multiple discussions with third Parties. This may 
have resulted in part from the fact that by COP-6.5 and 7 the 
EU had well established negotiation positions, or at least the 
key principles underlying such positions, therefore allowing it 
to reach out to other Parties. It remains to be seen whether 
(hat was more the result of a particular Presidency (Belgium at 
the time) or the beginning of a change of practice. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK: CAN THE EU LEAD THE WAY 
BEYOND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL? 
Legge and Egenhofer have labeled this next phase as "the 
regionalization of the Kyoto Protocol."319 Just before COP-7, 
316 "EU ready to renegotiate Kyoto," BBC News (Apr. 7, 2001). 
316 "EU to send Delegations to Pacific, Canada on Climate Change; Japan Plans 
similar Trip," BNA-Intl. Env. Reporter, supra note 313, at 499. 
317 See Decision 5/CP.6, in U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/20011L.7. 
318 Concluding in a similar vein, Ott, supra note 54. 
319 T. Legge and C. Egenhofer, Mter Marrakech: the regionalisation of the Kyoto 
Protocol. CEPS Commentary (2001). Available at: http://www.ceps.be (visited Dec.12, 
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the European Commission adopted a major package of deci-
sions on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the implementa-
tion of the European Climate Change Program, and a frame-
work Directive for greenhouse gas emissions trading within the 
European Community (see section IV, above). Although this 
effort represents considerable progress towards ratification and 
implementation, coupled with Member States' own implemen-
tation plans, the EU should not be complacent and should 
learn from past lessons on domestic policies and measures. The 
ratification and implementation processes need to be under-
stood as on-going tasks. With regard to the former, the EU and 
its Member States are demonstrating leadership by having 
ratified Protocol on time for its entry into force the World Sum-
mit on Sustainable Development in the latter half of 2002.320 
EU ratification alone, however, will not ensure that the 
Protocol enters into force. As a result, the EU needs to con-
tinue pressuring other key Parties to ratify.321 
Furthermore, it is essential to bring the U.S. back into the 
Kyoto game and the EU must playa key role here. U.S. "free-
riding" on climate change raises deeper issues of equity for the 
international community as a whole,322 and may increase the 
reluctance of developing countries to take mitigation commit-
ments of their own. Climate change is a challenge that is here 
to stay-it is a century-scale global commons problem. Having 
the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases outside a global 
climate change regime cannot be sustained for a long period of 
time. It is therefore essential to re-engage the U.S. on serious 
climate talks, using if necessary avenues other than the 
UNFCCC. The establishment of a high-level working group at 
the EU-U.S. summit in Gothenburg in 2001 may constitute an 
initial basis for continued contacts between the two blocs. 323 
2001). 
320 See March 2002 Environment Council, supra note 72. See also "EU Ministers 
Agree to Kyoto Ratification: Some Nations Differ over Emissions Targets," BNA-Intl. 
Env. Reporter, vol. 25, No.6, at 257 (Mar. 13, 2002). See also on the EU having ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol, EU ratification, supra note 9. 
321 A good example came from John Prescott, who urged the world's biggest per 
capita emitter, Australia, not to hide behind the U.S. and use this as an excuse not to 
do anything. "Australia warned on Kyoto" AAP (Dec. 2001). 
322 M.S. Soroos, Global climate change and the futility of the Kyoto process, 1(2) 
Global Environmental Politics, 1-9. 
323 On Mar. 4 2002, the Environment Council " ... confirmed its willingness to pursue 
a dialogue with the United States in the framework of the EUlUnited States High 
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However, the recent U.S. administration proposal on climate 
change represents a set back in terms of its international en-
gagement, as under that plan U.S. emissions are estimated to 
grow at business-as-usuallevels.324 Initial European reactions 
indicate clear skepticism from their part.325 
The EU seems to be the only Party willing and capable to 
bridge the divide between the Umbrella Group and the develop-
ing countries. Assuming the Protocol enters into force, as Par-
ties prepare for the negotiations of second commitment period 
targets, the strategy of bringing the U.S. on board must be 
played in tandem with the negotiation of developing countries' 
targets. Some developing countries may be more willing than 
others to take on commitments. 
Rather ironically, the U.S. withdrawal form the Kyoto Pro-
tocol might have contributed significantly to Europe taking the 
role of leading the climate change regime into full being. As 
the EU continues to assert itself internationally, its responsi-
bility increases accordingly. To seize this opportunity of lead-
Level Group . . ." See March 2002 Council (Authors' translation from the original 
French version), supra note 72. 
324 See e.g. "Blowing smoke", The Economist (Feb. 16, 2001), at 27-28; and Special 
Report: Climate Change," BNA-Intl. Env. Reporter, vol. 25, No.5, at 244-250 (Feb. 27, 
2002). 
325 Jaume MATAS, Minister for Environment, Spanish Presidency of the EU and 
Margot WALLSTROM, Commissioner for Environment, European Commission, Reac-
tion by the European Union to the Speech by President Bush on Climate Change of 
Feb. 14, 2002, available at <http://www.europa.eu.intlrapid/startlcgilguesten.ksh?p_ 
action.gettxt=gt&doc=MEMOI02/33I 0 I RAPID&lg=EN&display=.> (visited Feb. 22, 
2001). 
It is clear that the proposals for U.S. action on climate change are purely domestic. But 
the EU is concerned that they will not even be sufficient to reduce U.S. emissions. The 
"intensity target" proposed allows for further increases in absolute emissions and is not 
sufficient to fight climate change effectively. In contrast, the Kyoto Protocol requires 
most industrialised countries to achieve absolute emission reductions, while they still 
expect economic growth. 
The March 2002 Council, supra note 72, after approving the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol by the EC, commented on President Bush's plan as follows (Authors' transla-
tion from the original French version) 
... The Council ... 
- is concerned that the [U.S. President's) proposed measures, which allow for an in-
crease in greenhouse gases at a rate close to the present rate, are insufficient to effec-
tively combat climate change; 
- expects all parties to the UNFCCC, including the USA, the leading emitter of green-
house gases, to assume their responsibilities under the convention, which demands 
industrialised countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels .... 
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ership, the EU needs to change internal procedures and prac-
tices, and engage more widely with third Parties. 
It has already been pointed out that the EU needs to lay 
more emphasis on timely coalition building, especially with the 
group of developing countries. In addition, in order to fulfill 
the important leadership functions the EU is called to perform 
in the years to come, it will have to improve the internal deci-
sion-making process, which has proven inefficient and too 
cumbersome for the needs of climate negotiating sessions (see 
Sections II, III). Some of the internal issues addressed 
throughout this paper include: 
• The EU cannot afford paralyzing itself by regular hag-
gling over competences. The EU needs to at least agree 
on a common mid and long-term strategy on climate 
change, and on a modus operandi for international nego-
tiations, which assigns clear negotiating and decision-
making powers to the Commission and/or to the Member 
States according to their perceived "comparative advan-
tage." These negotiators need to be authorized to act with 
flexibility, i.e. to enter into bargaining with third Parties 
without being forced to assure consensus among all EU 
Member States in the case of each modification to original 
agreed EU negotiating positions. Member States must 
hence give up some (paralyzing) control in order to ensure 
higher overall effectiveness of the EU negotiating prac-
tice, which in turn would improve its relationship to ne-
gotiating partners. 
• Like in other environmental regimes, the Commission 
rather than the Presidency should take the lead on cli-
mate negotiations. This would not be incompatible with a 
clearer division of labor among the Commission and the 
Member States described in the preceding bullet, in that 
the Commission would work closely with the Member 
States in both preparing and negotiating a common posi-
tion. In fact, such a division of labor would require that 
someone ensure the medium and long-term continuity, 
stability and consistency of EU negotiating positions. 
The Commission seems to be better equipped for that 
task in that it is by definition and practice the "guardian 
of the Treaties" i.e. of EU policies and regulations. 
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• In addition, the EU needs to enter into negotiating ses-
sions with more elaborate positions in order to ensure a 
greater impact on the overall design of the regime. It also 
and very importantly needs to develop potential fall-back 
positions ahead of time to allow for more flexibility and 
quick moves in the decisive phases of international bar-
gaining process. As a result, the internal process for 
reaching a common position needs to be streamlined by, 
for instance, having a system of ''lead countries" to pre-
pare, in close coordination with the Commission, draft 
common negotiating positions to be decided by Council. 
In fact, some Member States have historically provided 
most of the intellectual capital to selected issues, and at 
times such a system of lead countries has been adopted 
during negotiating sessions. The EU would nonetheless 
benefit from having such a practice made more perma-
nent and effective between negotiating sessions . 
• Finally, in terms of the specific institutional arrange-
ments within the EU to further this leadership strategy, 
the Gupta and Grubb suggestion that climate change 
should become part of the EU's Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy, thereby greatly enhancing its profile.326 
In conclusion, the ED's main priorities in the mid-Iong-
term relate to its ability to (a) implement effective domestic 
climate policies-leading by example; (b) reform internal proc-
esses so as to ensure it is more capable to lead the interna-
tional negotiations (e.g. the role of the Commission); and (c) 
prepare itself adequately for the second commitment period 
negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol (by in particular ''bridg-
ing the gap" between the U.S. and the developing countries). If 
the EU manages ·to develop more efficient ways to coordinate 
its many voices-maybe sometimes even without reaching con-
sensus-, it will be better able to lead the international climate 
change process. The analysis of the history of EU climate 
change policy, now ten years old, has revealed a mixed record 
that, in spite of all its shortcomings, gives rise to guarded op-
timism for continued international coordination and coopera-
tion on the management of the global commons. 
326 GUPTA & GRUBB, supra note 4, at 305. 
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